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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME = DECEMBER, 1952 NUMBER 3
NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE AT
THE THRESHOLD OF 1953"
JOHN F. X. FINNT
S HORTLY after the New York Legislature reconvenes on January 7,
1953, it will receive for the third successive year a resolution which
in effect asks each member this question:
"Is New York's procedural code a Brobdingnagian conglomeration of
heterogeneous rules of law and practice?"'
However this resolution may fare, the 1953 legislative session will
inevitably enact amendments of the Civil Practice Act and related pro-
cedural statutes. These may deal with existing procedural oddities - or
* This article consolidates and revitalizes a Bar Association address and a review of
1952 legislation. The former was entitled Current Trends in New York Civil Practice and
Procedure, and published in 7 R1coRD OF THE Associrzo.N or T E BAR, Czxv or Nsw YoWa
63-103 (1952). The latter was entitled 1952 Civil Practice Changes and published in the
N.Y. ST. Baa. BU=. 137-45 (1952). It was reprinted in 128 N.Y.L.J. 60-70 (July 10, 11,
1952).
t Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. N.Y. Leg. Index 683-4 (Assembly Resolution No. 114 1952) (Mr. Brook); N.Y.
Leg. Index 627-S (Assembly Resolution No. 30, 1951) (Mr. Brook). See Finn, New Pro-
cedure for Old, 4 FORD. L. REv. 228, 232 n. 11 (1935).
2. a) In connection with a proceeding to open a private road, Sections 306 and 307 of
the Highway Law actually provide for a trial without a judge. Section 306 requires a
Justice of the Peace to draw a jury of twelve persons who then serve as a jury, and
"The duties of the Justice of the Peace in connection with the proceeding Ehall end
after the jury is sworn."
b) In the index to Jessup-Redfield's Law and Practice in the Surrogates' Courts, there
is the following definition of a "Demurrer," preserved through at least eight editions:
"Demurrer. None in Surrogate's Court. (See Treatise on Snakes in Ireland)."
c) Section 42 of the New York Civil Practice Act, unannotated for almost thirty years,
calmly provides that the right of a person in possession of real property is not affected
"by descent cast." To translate this, I have had to go back to Section 237(b) of Coke
upon Littleton (1791), to the effect that when a person had acquired land by intrusion
and died seized of the land, the descent of it to his heir took away or tolled the real
owner's right of entry, so that he could only recover the land by action.
d) Section 348 (a) of the New York Civil Practice Act enacted in 1939 provides for
the admissibility in evidence by reading from the cases on appeal, of testimony adduced
in two actions, Miner v. City of New York et at., 37 Super. (5 J. & S.) 171 (1874) and
Sherman et al. v. Kane et al., 86 N.Y. 57 (1881).
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with procedural reforms which have been suggested in various quarters,8
Perhaps consideration will be given to the comparative merits of the
eighty-six Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the eleven hundred
sections of the New York Civil Practice Act which cover the same subject-
matter.4
Certainly there will be legislative reflection upon the first year's experi-
ence with New York's most recent attempt at "wide-open" examinations
before trial.'
Whatever the scope or the depth of the procedural legislation of 1953,
it is hoped that the legislature will take as its text Chief Judge Crane's
great sentence in Gucker et al. v. Town of Huntington et al.: "The path-
way to the courthouse is not as important as what happens when we
get there."6
e) For statutes of limitation purposes, causes of action for breach of covenants of
seizin or against encumbrances are not deemed to have accrued until there has been "an
eviction, and not before" (N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 11). This is hardly a statute of repose.
f) The New York Civil Practice Act comprehensively grants to the Supreme Court the
jurisdiction which was possessed and exercised by the Court of Chancery in England on
July 4, 1776. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 64.
3. a) Despite the tabling in 1947 of the project to extend the rule-making power of the
courts, there are many interstices in the statutes where further judicial "knee-action" should
be permitted by the enactment of statutory provisions comparable to Sections 247 and 277
of the New York Civil Practice Act.
b) The "unnecessary complexity" of Interpleader in New York is apparent. Frumer,
On Revising the New York Interpleader Statutes, 25 N.Y.L. R.v. 737 (1950).
c) The Judicial Council is preharing a comprehensive revision of practice and procedure
in Replevin. Seventeenth Report of the New York Judicial Council 241-90 (1951)-hereln-
after referred to as Seventeenth Report J.C.
d) And in Arbitration. Id. at 213-40.
e) Appellate practice needs a general overhauling. It is much too cumbersome, treacherous
and abounding in sharp quillets. For example, when an Appellate Division reverses "upon
the law and the facts", without specifying the facts, the Court of Appeals will deem this
a reversal upon the law only, and it may reverse the reversal if there was no error of law
below. Hart et al. v. Blabey, 287 N.Y. 257, 39 N.E. 2d 230 (1942), construing N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. ACT § 602.
f) Should the New York Civil Practice Act Sections 100 and 218 be amended to provide
that an action is started upon filing a complaint?
4. Keefe, Brooks and Greer, 86 or 1100, 32 CoRN. L. Q. 253, 269 (1946). Cf. Cohen et al.
v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp. et al, 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Keefe, Gilhooley, Bailey and
Day, Weary Erie, 34 CoRN. L.Q. 494 (1949); Note, 35 CoRx. L.Q. 420 (1950); Note,
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1030 (1949).
5. RULES Civ. PRAc. 121 (a), as amended July 1, 1952. See Peck, The Pillar of Justice,
127 N.Y.L.J. 179, 180 (Jan. 15, 1952). See also New Trial Term Rules X in N.Y. County
and XIX in Bronx County, effective Jan. 1, 1952.
6. 268 N.Y. 43, 51, 196 N.E. 737, 740 (1935).
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TnE RooTs OF PROCEDURAL TRENDS
Trends have roots. And, paradoxically, roots frequently germinate
in the ivory towers of scholarship. The roots of current New York pro-
cedural growth have been laid bare in such places as in Judge Mledina's
comprehensive articles of 19457 and 1947,8 in the Annual Reports of the
Judicial Council,9 in the 1950 "Dissent and Protest" of Judge Charles
E. Clark and Mr. Charles Alan Wright, 0 and in the 1951 Commentary
of Messrs. Ilsen and Snyder."
The "fireworks" of the Council-Clark-Ilsen debate are found first in
the 1947 decision of the Judicial Council to abandon a proposal of the
New York County Lawyers Association that the Court of Appeals be
empowered to prescribe civil procedure by rules, subject to modification
by the legislature. The Council's Report said, among other things:
"The present system of civil procedure presently employed in New York
State works very well .... That New York possesses one of the most efficient
systems of civil practice in the country is generally conceded."'-
Dissenting, Judge Clark and Mr. Charles Alan Wright wrote:
"It seems to us that the quoted words contain about as many errors as can
well be compressed into so brief a space. ... The Council's continuous and
praiseworthy attempts to secure enactment piecemeal in this State of the recog-
nized best modern practice constitute a convincing demonstration that New
York as yet does not have 'one of the most efficient systems' in the country...
If court control must remain thus limited and subordinated (by legislative
pressures) then we fear that New York is destined to stay long in its present
state of procedural darkness."' 3
7. Medina, Current Developments in Pleading, Practice and Procedure in the New York
Courts, 30 Come. L. Q. 449, 465 (1945).
8. Medina, Recent Developments in Pleading and Practice in New York, 32 Con!.. L. Q.
313, 336 (1947).
9. These reports are "extremely persuasive on the question of legislative intent.' Inter-
chemical Corp. v. Mirabelli et al., 269 App. Div. 224, 227, 54 N.Y.S.2d 522, 525 (1st Dep't
1945); Fontheim v. Third Ave. Ry., 257 App. Div. 147, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 90 (1st Dep't 1939);
Matter of Derry, 161 Misc. 125, 291 N.Y.S. 22 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
10. Clark and Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rude Making Power; A Dissent
and a Protest, 1 SYRA CusE LAw RvIw 346-68 (1950).
11. Ilsen and Snyder, Comments on the Civil Practice Act and the Judicial Council, 23
N.Y. ST. BAR Bu.LL. 122-40 (April, 1951). To these might be added Judge McCullen's
excellent books, Examinations before Trial (rev. 2d ed. 1950) and Bills of Particulars (1942),
as well as Mr. Samuel S. Tripp's fine Guide to Motion Practice, (rev. ed. 1949 and 1951-1952
supp.). See also Clark's ingenious Annotator-Digest of the New York Law Journal; the
Law Report News; the new Law Review Digest, in handy Reader's Digest form; and the
Index to Legal Periodicals.
12. Thirteenth Report J.C. 55, 56 (1947).
13. See note 10 supra.
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The Ilsen-Snyder rejoinder of 1951 is to the effect that:
"We find a record of achievement and endeavor (in New York) which
touches upon many branches of procedure. Indeed, it is to the New York
Judicial Council that credit must chiefly go for introducing the many new
methods adopted in this state during the past 15 years and for clarifying
erroneous constructions which have sometimes grown up about old and estab-
lished procedures."1 4
So much for the trend of "fireworks" or heat lightning or the sparking
of flint upon flint. In this trend, at least, New York and its critics are
not subject to Chief Justice Vanderbilt's observation that "One of the
strangest phenomena in the law is the general indifference of the legal
profession to the technicalities, the anachronisms and the delays in our
procedural law."'
JURISDICTION OF COURTS AND CALENDAR CONGESTION
On January 1, 1952, the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of the
City of New York was increased to $3000,11 and that of the City Court
of the City of New York was increased to $6000.11
This accelerates a trend initiated in 1949 by Presiding Justice Peck
when he induced the enactment of Civil Practice Act Section 110 (b), pro-
viding for Removal on Consent from the Supreme Court to courts of
limited jurisdiction and the new preference rules."' The Municipal Courts
particularly have not been suffering from overloaded calendars. The
Supreme Court is bogged down. The rationale of the trend manifest is
to siphon as many litigations as possible out of or away from the Supreme
Court. Cases which have not been preferred will not be pre-tried. Com-
bine with this (a) the "opening up" of personal injury examinations
before trial, (b) the "Clerk's call," (c) the new 2 P.M. calendar call in
the Supreme Court for the purpose of inducing waivers of jury trial,
(d) the new "perpetual ready calendar" of a "hard core" of old cases,
inaugurated at the opening of the trial parts in September, 1952, and
(e) the constant reprocessing of cases and "toughening" of judges in
the pre-trial parts, and you have some idea of the effect that "pecking
away" at the Supreme Court calendars inevitably will have in 1953.
14. See note 11 supra.
15. VANDERBILT, MINnMr STANDARDS oF JUDICIAL ADINsrrATIoN XVII (1949).
16. N.Y. CITY MuN. CT. CoDE § 6.
17. NY. CONST. Art. VI, § 15; N.Y. CITY CT. ACT § 16; Seventeenth Report J.C. 54
(1951). The civil jurisdiction of county courts outside New York City is still only $3000,
but the 1951 legislature proposed a constitutional amendment to amend N.Y. CONST. Art.
VI, § 11 to increase the amount to $6000 (N.Y. Leg. Index 61, 1951). This will undoubtedly
be submitted to the legislature of 1953.
18. Rule V (5), Trial Term, N.Y. Sup. Ct.
[Vol. 21
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Certainly the insurance companies will have to add substantially to their
trial staffs at once, as apparently a very effective groundswell is now in
motion to wash away the calendar judge's constant complaint that the
nub of the law's delay is the holding of too many cases "subject" to the
engagements of too few trial lawyers.
Another proposal for speeding up the calendars that is "in the wind" is
one to permit the "cross-assignment" of judges from court to court. Thus,
the 1951 legislature passed a proposed constitutional amendment toward
this end.'" The effect of this would be to permit the justices of the Ap-
pellate Divisions to make temporary assignments into the Supreme Court
in New York City of judges of the County Courts in New York City
and of the Court of General Sessions, which is in effect the County Court
of New York County. Thus we would have criminal court judges once
again trying civil cases within the City of New York. Similarly, City
Court justices would be assignable into the Supreme Court, and Munici-
pal Court justices, along with Special Sessions justices, would be assign-
able into the City Court. Another concurrent resolution passed in 1951
and similarly to be submitted to the legislature of 1953 (apparently as
an alternative) would permit the assignment of Special Sessions justices
into the Court of General Sessions and the County Courts within the
City of New York.20
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals has been increased by elimi-
nating the necessity of a stipulation for final order absolute when the
Court of Appeals grants permission to appeal from a non-final order of
the Appellate Division "in a proceeding instituted by or against one or
more public officers, or a board, commission or other body of public
officers of a court or tribunal."
2
'
1
A comprehensive revision of the Civil Practice Act in relation to an
action to recover a chattel is accomplished by an amendment to Section
1093 and following sections of the Civil Practice Act.2
Garnishee proceedings are principally governed by Civil Practice Act
Section 684, which was amended in 1939 and 1950. There was then no
comparable amendment to Justice Court Act Section 300. Now, by
Chapter 44 of the New York Laws of 1950, conformity changes are made,
so that "$15 or more per week" is changed to "$30 or more per week"
and "$12 per week" is changed to "$25 per week". Also, there is a
change from five days to fifteen days in the paragraph of Section 300
19. N.Y. Leg. Index 12 (Sen. Int. 121, Pr. 121, 1951), to amend N.Y. Co~:sr. Art. VI,
§§ 1, 2, and 16 and to add § 15 (a).
20. N.Y. Leg. Index 108 (Sen. Int. 1378, Pr. 1408, 1951).
21. N.Y. Laws 1952 c. 251, effective Mar. 26, 1952, amending N.Y. Crv. PRc. Acr § 589.
22. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 829. See Seventeenth Report J.C. 79-80 and supporting study F,
241-90 (1951).
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governing garnishment of wages of city, county and board of education
employees.
County Courts outside New York City have been given jurisdiction
of actions to compel the determination of a claim to real property under
Article 15 of the Real Property Law.' Article 15 itself has been aug-
mented by extending its use to cases where there has been a void or
voidable mortgage foreclosure, even though reforeclosure may be barred
by the statute of limitations.24
In the Municipal Court of the City of New York, since September 1,
1952, a chattel may be replevied at any time before the entry of final
judgment whether or not issue has been joined.21 Also, in that court
the undertaking in replevin is hereafter to be filed with the clerk rather
than delivered to the marshal.2 0
In the same Municipal Court, an action for conversion or to recover
the possession of a chattel is permitted in addition to the present remedy
of foreclosure of a lien on a chattel by a conditional vendor, lessor or
chattel mortgagee.2
Justices of the Peace now have jurisdiction up to $500 where they
previously were limited to $200 and up to $100 where they were previ-
ously limited to $50.28
Miscellaneous jurisdictional changes adopted in 1952 are found in the
footnotes.29
23. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 150, amending N.Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr § 67 (1).
24. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 610, adding N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 500 (a), 506 (a) and
506 (b). See REPORT OF T=E NEW YoRa STATE LAW REvisIoN Comz msSiON, N.Y. LEO.
Doc. No. 65K (1951). This eases the stringency resultant from the shortening in 1938 and
1941 of the periods of limitation from 20 to 6 years. See saving clauses, however.
25. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 551, amending N.Y. CITY MUN. CT. ConDE § 58.
26. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 552. With respect to this chapter and the previous one, see
Seventeenth Report J.C. 276" (1951).
27. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 830. See Seventeenth Report J.C. 269-75 (1951).
28. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 764, amending N.Y. JUST. CT. Acr §§ 3, 4, 109, 14, 264 and 267,
effective Jan. 1, 1952.
29. An additional Supreme Court justice is authorized for the third judicial district.
N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 788. Similarly there is an extra Supreme Court justice authorized for
the fourth judicial district. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 764. Queens County has been given four
county judges in place of two. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 832, amending N.Y. Jun1c. LAW
§ 189 (3).
The monetary jurisdiction of the City Court of Plattsburgh has been increased to $1500.
N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 429. That of the City Court of Long Beach has been increased to $2000.
N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 434. That of White Plains City Court is increased to $3000. N. Y.
Laws 1952, c. 711. As to the City Court of Norwich, see N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 812; and as
to the City Court of Kingston, see N.Y. Laws 1952, cc. 813, 814. Courts of Special
Sessions now have jurisdiction over violations of Articles 18 and 21 of the Tax Law. N.Y.
Laws 1952, c. 204, amending N.Y. CODE CRUX. PROC. § 56 (35b).
Magistrates have been given jurisdiction (in a "Girls Term") of delinquent girls 16 to
[Vol. 21
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RENT CONTROL
Comprehensive revision has been enacted of both the Emergency Com-
mercial Space Rent Control Law30 and of the Emergency Business Space
Rent Control Law.31
An apartment in a "co-operative" apartment house is deemed a "one-
family house" for rent control purposes, so that its owner may evict a
tenant from it without a showing of "immediate and compelling
necessity."31"
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
In proceedings to recover possession of premises occupied for dwelling
purposes, the life of Civil Practice Act Section 435, subdivisions 4-9
inclusive, has been extended to July 1, 1953. 2
An application to dispossess may now be made by "the lessee of the
entire premises of which the demised premises form a part, provided his
lease is for a term of not less than 10 years."'
Holdover tenants who do not pay rent may be dispossessed even if
they hold over with the oral permission of the landlord, or with written
permission which has been revoked.34
CAPACITY TO SUE
1. Foreign Executors and other Legal Representatives
Heretofore, in order to protect New York creditors of foreign decedents,
foreign legal representatives have lacked legal capacity to sue in New
York courts unless they had obtained ancillary letters here. This rule has
been changed. Now, Section 160 of the Decedent's Estate Law permits
the foreign legal representative to sue here in like manner as a non-
resident, upon complying with certain precautionary restrictions set forth
in the statute.35
When considering suits against foreign legal representatives, it should
be remembered that Section 160 does not apply. They may of course be
21 years of age, in proceedings to be deemed civil in character so far as practicable. N.Y.
Laws 1951, c. 716.
Prisoners not under sentence of death may be ordered up to testify by county judges,
special county judges and judges of General Sessions, as wel as Supreme Court justices.
N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 485.
30. N.Y. Laws 1952, c.416.
31. N.Y. Laws 1952, c.417.
31a. Matter of Wattley, 305 N.Y. , N.E.2d -. (decided Nov. 20, 1952).
32. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 242.
33. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 351, amending N.Y. Cirv. PnAc. Acr § 1414 by adding new
subdivision 9.
34. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 495, amending N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1410(2).
35. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 522, adding N.Y. Dac. EsT. LAw § 160.
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sued in rem36 or quasi in rem, upon an attachment of assets within the
state,3 7 and they may in certain cases be subjected to in personam juris-
diction, as where a nonresident motorist uses the highways of New York,
causes an accident, and later dies. His legal representative may be sued
here, in personam. 8 Judge Froessel's opinion in Leighton v. Roper et al.,a°
is an excellent textbook on this subject. Its highlight is a sentence at page
441 to the effect that "an action against an executor or administrator is
not one purely in rem, and may therefore be founded on consent juris-
diction."
2. Civil Death
The law continues to whittle at the problem of "civil death." Capacity
to sue in connection with matters not arising out of their arrest or deten-
tion is now granted to persons sentenced to imprisonment for life, while
they are released on parole or when sentences are imposed upon them
with the execution of the judgment suspended, and such execution of
judgment remains suspended.4°
3. Change of Name
On all applications for change of name by persons born in New York
State there must be annexed to each petition, commencing September 1,
1952, either a birth certificate or a certified transcript thereof, or a cer-
tificate of the commissioner of the local Board of Health that none is
available. The order must recite the date and place of birth of the appli-
cant and if he was born in New York, the number of his birth certificate
or that no birth certificate is available.41
If a resident of the City of New York petitions the City Court of the
City of New York for a change of his name he may apply to any branch
of that court in any borough of the city.4"
LIMITATIONS OF TIME
The trend is in the direction of repose.
True, as heretofore pointed out, we still have a cause of action for
36. Holmes et al. v. Camp et al., 219 N.Y. 359, 372, 114 N.E. 841, 844 (1916).
37. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 520. Cf. Kirkbride v. Van Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 9 N.E. 2d
852 (1937); Helne v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363, 367, 128 N.E. 216, 218 (1920).
38. N.Y. VMICLF AND TPRAIc LAW §§ 51, 51a. Leighton v. Roper et al., 300 N.Y.
434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950). See also Rogers et al. v. Gould et al., 206 App. Div. 433, 201
N.Y. Supp. 535 (1st Dep't 1923); In re De Baun's Will, 162 Misc. 111, 293 N.Y. Supp.
836 (Sur. Ct. 1937) ; Ferguson v. Harder, 141 Misc. 466, 252 N.Y. Supp. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
39. 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. 2d 876 (1950).
40. N.Y. Laws'1952, c. 167, amending N.Y. PENAL LAW § 511.
41. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 643.
42. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 426, amending N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 60.
[Vol. 21
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breach of a covenant of seizin or freedom from encumbrances accruing
upon eviction," but we have come a long way in other directions.
In 1925, 1938 and 1941 we forthrightly shortened many periods of
limitation from 30 years to 20 years," or from 20 to 6 years 5 In one
respect we had to back-track slightly because of the constitutional
mandate against a gift of state moneys.40
In other respects we have moved forward.
In 1949, Section 41 (a) was added to the Civil Practice Act, providing
that where tenants in common occupy land, the occupancy of one is
deemed to have been the possession of the other, even though the occu-
pant has acquired another title or has claimed to hold adversely to the
other-
".... but this presumption shall not be made after the expiration of fifteen
years of continuous occupancy by such tenant, ... or after an ouster by one
tenant of the other."
This statute, recommended by the Law Revision Commission, thus
limits to fifteen years a presumption that might otherwise run on and
on unmercifully, to the confusion of real estate titles.
In 195111 amendments were made, again on recommendation of the
Law Revision Commission, to Sections 43 and 60 of the Civil Practice
Act. Section 43 deals with actions to recover real property or the pos-
session thereof, and Section 60 deals with actions other than real property
actions. These amendments endeavor to clarify situations such as the
one presented in Howell et al. v. Leavitt et a-s It will be recalled that
in the Howell case the court, per Finch, J., stated:
"The exception of the Code relates to the extension of the time limited, and
puts restraint only upon that extension. It means that the disability shall not
add more than ten years to the time limited after the disability has ended.
Practically, in a case of infancy, it makes the extreme possible limitation a
period of thirty-one years. If the cause of action accrues to an infant on the
43. N.Y. Civ. PRAe. ACr § 11. Note that in 1941 the indicated language was deleted
from Civil Practice Action Section 47 (a), but transferred to Section 11. N.Y. Laws 1941,
c. 329. See N.Y. Lmo. Doe. No. 65M (1941). I am indebted to Professor Joseph McGovern
for impressing upon me the anachronism of preserving this language.
44. N.Y. Crv. PRnc. AcT §§33-35.
45. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT §§47, 47 (a).
46. N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. Acr § 47 (b); REPoRT or ran NEw Yo STAvr Law Rrxsxo:;
CommnssoN, 193-219, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65 H (1950). See N.Y. Co;%sr. Art. VII, § 8;
Art. VIII, § 1; Campbell et al. v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885); Gallersl v. Hentz, 301
N.Y. 164, 93 N.E.2d 620 (1950); Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. State of New York,
243 N.Y. 231, 153 N.E. 58 (1926).
47. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 263.
48. 95 N.Y. 617 (1884).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
day of its birth for twenty-one years the running of the statute is suspended;
then it begins to run; but the time limited-that is, the twenty years considered
as a period-having in fact elapsed, it is an extension of that period which is
in progress, and the exception limits that added time to not more than ten
years after full age; that is until the expiration of thirty-one years. But for
the exception the infant would have had forty-one years.... ,,49
The 1951 amendment to Section 43 generally shortens the extension
of time heretofore provided after a disability ceases. That time is now
extended five years after the disability ceases, but only if the time expires
less than five years after either the disability ceases or the person under
disability dies. Hence, if an infant is one year of age when an action for
which the time limited is fifteen years accrues, the last age at which the
action can be brought is twenty-six. If the infant is twelve years of age
when the action accrues, his last age for commencing action would be
twenty-seven, there being no extension of time, because the time limited
would expire more than five years after the disability ceases. Prior to
the 1951 amendments, the last ages for bringing the action in the example
cited would be, respectively, thirty-one and thirty-six, according to Judge
Finch's statement just quoted from the Howell case. In the cases of
insanity and imprisonment, moreover, the statute now includes a pro-
vision limiting the maximum time, as extended, to thirty years after the
cause of action accrues.
Section 60, in cases of insanity or imprisonment, limits the maximum
time as extended to fifteen years after the cause of action accrues instead
of providing, as heretofore, for an extension of five years beyond the
time otherwise limited. This is a provision of repose. On the other hand,
the amendments to Section 60 somewhat lengthen the extension of time
after the disability ceases, as a by-product of endeavoring to arrive at a
reasonable and uniform formula. Thus, if the period of limitation is
five years or more, such time is now extended five years after the dis-
ability ceases, but only if that time expires before the disability ceases or
less than five years after the disability ceases. Hence an action for which
the time limited is six years, accruing at the ages of 1, 16 and 20, may
in each of the three cases be brought up to the age of 26, whereas for-
merly the last ages for bringing the actions would have been respectively
22, 22 and 26.
As to actions for which the time limited is less than five years, the time
limited is extended by the period of disability. E.g., an action for which
the time limited is three years, accruing at any time during infancy, may
be brought until the person reaches the age of twenty-four 0
49. Id. at 623.
50. See REPORT or TE Nrw YORK STATE LAW REVISION Co xussiON, N.Y. LEO. Doc.
No. 65 L (1951).
(Vol. 21
1952] NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 20S
Turning back for a moment to Section 11 of the Civil Practice Act,
we note that that section continues to provide that the statute of limi-
tations is computed from the time of the accruing of a right to the time
when the claim to relief "is actually interposed by a plaintiff or defendant
in a particular action or special proceeding." Reading this together with
Civil Practice Act Section 61 indicates that the statute of limitations
continues to run against a defendant's counterclaim until the counter-
claim is actually asserted in an answer."
It is still useful to read Sections 13, 19 and 55 of the Civil Practice
Act together. These deal with actions against non-residents, actions in
which a cause of action arose outside of the state, and actions in which
the defendant absents himself from the state or resides within it under
a false name. Looking back upon the amendments of 1943, I think that
they have been decidedly for the better. 2
Civil Practice Act Section 17 continues to be a very valuable section
where the statute of limitations is threatening to run out. Two recent
cases illustrate this very neatly. In Sauerzopf v. North American Cement
Corp. 3 a federal statute colloquially known as the "Portal-to-portal
Act ' 14 provided that an "action shall be considered to commence on the
date when the complaint is filed." Judge Conway wrote that "We do not
believe that Congress thereby intended to establish a rule of procedure
for state courts." Accordingly the action was deemed started with the
service of a summons. Again, in Irons v. Michigan-Atlantic Corp... the
court held, per Piper, J., that:
"When an action is brought in the state court, the laws of the state are
controlling in interpreting the provisions of a federal statute of limitations as
to what constitutes the commencing of an action. (Goldenburg v. 3lftrphy, 108
U.S. 162; see also Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U. S. 77). '"z(
Section 27 of the Civil Practice Act has been amended so as to change
51. Black v. Van Aiken, 224 App. Div. 759, 230 N.Y. Supp. 803 (2d Dep't 1928);
Fish v. Conley, 221 App. Div. 609, 225 N.Y. Supp. 27 (3d Dep't 1927).
52. See N.Y. LrG. Doc. No. 65 F (1943) ; and N.Y. Laws 1943, c.516.
53. 301 N.Y. 158, 93 N.E.2d 617 (1950).
54. 61 STAT. 87, 29 U.S.C. 251 (1947).
55. 279 App. Div. 32, 108 N.Y.S.2d 824 (4th Dep't 1951).
56. The action was one for wrongful death under the Jones Act, (41 ST,%T. 1007, 46
U.S.C. 688 (1920)) which requires that an action be "commenced within three years from
the day the cause of action accrued." Decedent drowned on Septembey 29, 1946. The
summons was delivered to the sheriff of New York County on September 27, 1949.
Service on an officer of defendant was made in New York County on October 19, 1949.
In the federal court an action is started by the ling of a complaint. (FED. R. Cmv. P. 3).
Defendant claimed that Section 17 of the New York Civil Practice Act applies only to
an action the limitation of time of which is governed by the Civil Practice AcL The court
brushed this contention aside, as indicated by the quotation in the text.
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the rule of Nathan v. Equitable Trust Co."7 which held that a person
disabled to sue by reason of enemy alienage was not entitled to addi-
tional time to sue unless the disability existed when his cause of action
accrued. The statute now provides that the statute of limitations does
not run against an alien subject or citizen of a country at war with the
United States "where the cause of action arose during or prior to the
period of such disability." A conforming amendment was made to Sec-
tion 28 and a new Section 28 (a) was added by Chapter 759 of the New
York Laws of 1950, effective April 17, 1950. The added section helps
non-enemies in enemy country or enemy-occupied countries and it has
been held constitutional as an express revival statute reviving a personal
cause of action where exceptional circumstances would work an
injustice."
Civil Practice Act Section 30 continues to provide that the statute of
limitations may be raised by answer or motion, apparently whether or
not the defect appears upon the face of the complaint. In Trans-America
Development Corp. v. Leon,"9 the plaintiff sued for $368,543 for services
rendered between 1936 and 1948. The defendant moved under Rule 107
for partial judgment dismissing so much of the plaintiff's cause of action
as appeared on the face of the complaint to be barred by the statute of
limitations. Special Term denied the motion with leave to plead the
statute of limitations as a partial defense, but the Appellate Division
reversed and granted the motion, Justice Dore writing as follows:
"In the absence of any evidentiary facts to avoid the statute, in the face of
the showing made in support of part of the claim being barred, the manifest
injustice of imposing upon defendant the expense of preparing for trial relating
to events that go back 12 years is accentuated by the fact that many of the
transactions relate to corporations in Roumania, which is now behind the
Iron Curtain."60
Civil Practice Act Section 44 continues to provide that a final judg-
ment or decree for a sum of money is presumed to be paid and satisfied
after twenty years, but that a demand or acknowledgment of an indebt-
edness of some part of the amount within the twenty years will rebut
the presumption. The acknowledgment must be in writing and signed
by the person to be charged. A pretty question recently arose as to
whether the exception included payments made under a garnishee
execution as well as voluntary payments. 1
57. 250 N.Y. 250, 165 N.E. 282 (1929).
58. Gallewski v. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164, 93 N.E. 2d 620 (1950).
59. 279 App. Div. 189, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (1st Dep't 1951).
60. This opinion appeared in 127 N.Y.L.J. 139, col. 1 (January 11, 1952). See also
LAw REP. NEws (Dec. 27, 1951).
61. Moran Towing et al. v. Fleming, 287 N.Y. 571, 38 N.E.2d 231 (1941).
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Civil Practice Act Section 48 continues to be an intriguing section for
lawyers involved in stockholders actions. Subdivision 5 provides that in
a fraud action the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until
discovery by the plaintiff. Subdivision 8, on the other hand, dealing with
actions against directors, officers or stockholders of corporations, pro-
vides that the six year statute applies even if the action is for an account-
ing, and apparently entirely apart from the question of discovery.
Further, if the action is for waste or an injury to property or for an
accounting in connection therewith, the three year limitation of Section
49 (7) applies on the theory that such actions are actions "to recover
damages for an injury to property."
It would be most difficult to pinpoint the law governing statutes of
limitations in stockholders actions. In such cases there is an interesting
theory of action which assumes, arguendo, that the plaintiff's primary
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations and then claims
that a secondary cause of action exists in that express and deliberate
representations of the defendants concealed the cause of action from the
corporation and its stockholders, in order to continue the running of the
statute of limitations. Whether this constitutes a cause of action based
on actual fraud which did not accrue until the discovery of the fraud
poses an interesting problem. I have in mind such discussions as those
found in Druckerman et al. v. Harbord et al.,w Lifshutz v. Adams et al.,0
American Cities Power & Light Corp. et al. v. Willams et al.,' and Alex-
ander et al. v. Anderson et al. 6 In the Alexander case the court said:
"As to the second cause of action, it is dependent upon the first; the grava-
men thereof is that the defendants deliberately prevented the corporation from
obtaining redress for the bonus mis-computation; that their objective was to
accomplish the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations against some
of the cause of action of the corporation, whereas, if they had been timely
asserted the corporation would have recovered thereon.
62. Investigators in that field should start with such cases as Mannaberg v. Klausner
et i., 294 N.Y. 859, 62 N.E.2d 487 (1945); Brundige et al. v. Bradley l al., 294 N.Y.
345, 62 N.E.2d 385 (1945); Hastings v. Byllesby et al., 293 N.Y. 404, 57 N.E.2d 733
(1944); Gobel, Inc. v. Hammerslough et al., 288 N.Y. 653, 42 N.E.2d 746 (1942);
Nasaba Corp. v. Harfred Realty Corp. et al., 287 N.Y. 290, 39 N.E. 2d 243 (1942) ; Frank
v. Carlisle et al., 286 N.Y. 586, 35 N.E. 2d 932 (1941); Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano et al.,
283 N.Y. 139, 27 N.E.2d 814 (1940); Brick et al. v. Cohn-HaHl-Marx Co., 276 N.Y. 259,
11 N.E. 2d 902 (1937); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200
N.E. 824 (1936).
63. 31 N.Y.S.2d S67, 871 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
64. 285 N.Y. 180, 185, 33 N.E.2d 83, 85 (1941).
65. 189 Misc. 829, 69 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
66. 267 App. Div. 984, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 801 (Ist Dep't 1944), affirming, 48 N.YS. 2d 102
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
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"Where the expiration of the statute of limitations results from a fraud or
other wrong practised upon one having an enforcible legal right, a cause of
action will lie for the loss sustained in consequence. "0 *
Section 50 (e) of the General Municipal Law has been amended to
provide that service of notice of a tort claim made on a public corpo-
ration within ninety days, which is technically defective, (e.g., which was
not served personally or by registered mail on a person legally designated
to receive service of a summons) shall nevertheless be valid if the notice
was actually received by that person and the party against whom the
claim is made causes an examination to be taken of the claimant or
other interested person."
The absolute exemption of certain Estate Tax proceedings and actions
from the time limitations of the Civil Practice Act has been modified by
providing that as to real property the tax shall cease to be a lien after
the expiration of fifteen years from the date of accrual. 8
Turning now to another subject, the statute of limitations has been
held to run in favor of one spouse against another even while the spouses
are living together. 9
Parenthetically, a husband's agreement to pay his wife's state income
taxes is unenforceable."0
A recent statute7' waves immunity from certain suits against the Port
of New York Authority with a one year period of limitation. This was
enacted to become law upon the enactment by the State of New Jersey
of legislation having an identical effect. The New Jersey Legislature of
1951 passed such legislation, and the Governor of New Jersey duly
signed it.7 7
Ravens Electric Co. v. Linzer et al.13 has been affected by Chapters
430 and 431 of the New York Laws of 1951, which raise a question as
to whether an independent action may now be maintained (rather than
a motion under Article 84) to set aside an award fixing rent, if brought
within the ninety day time limit of the statute. 4
66a. 48 N.Y.S. 2d 102, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
67. N.Y. Laws 1951, c.393, subd. 3.
68. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 205, effective Mar. 25, 1952, amending N.Y. TAX LAW § 249(j).
This section appears in Article 10B, which is applicable only to decedents who died on or
before September 1, 1930. It is to be compared with Section 245 of Article 10 and Section
248 (1) of Article 10A.
69. Dunning v. Dunning, 300 N.Y. 341, 90 N.E. 2d 884 (1950).
70. N.Y. TAX LAW § 385; Metcaef v. Metcaef, 274 App. Div. 744, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 722
(1st Dep't 1949), affirming, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Mahana v. Mahana, 272
App. Div. 1013, 74 N.Y.S. 2d 908 (1st Dep't 1947).
71. N.Y. Laws 1950, c. 301, § 7.
72. N.J. Laws 1951, c. 204.
73. 302 N.Y. 188, 97 N.E.2d 746 (1951).
74. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1463.
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The Workmen's Compensation Law Section 29 (2) was amended
by Chapter 527 of the New York Laws of 1951, to provide that
failure of an employee to commence an action within the time limited
shall not operate as an assignment of his cause of action to the insurance
carrier unless the insurer gives notice thereof at least thirty days prior
to the expiration of such time, and if such notice is not given the time
limited shall be extended to thirty days after notice is given. In the
Supreme Court of Kings County, Mr. Justice Moss has held that this
is a "new or additional remedy."
'70
In Workmen's Compensation and other "administrative tribunal" cases
a vital question of res judicata is passing through the courts. One judge
has held that despite a paucity of authority, the determination of an
administrative tribunal is never res judicata upon a court.70 Other cases
are to the contrary.-"
I throw this thought in here to let you know that discussion of the
dry-as-dust statutes of limitation has now been concluded and that we
are in transition to the subjects of Process, Pleading, Trial and Judg-
ment, through which each ordinary action runs a normal course.
Space does not permit touching upon the distinction between Civil Prac-
tice Act Sections 96 and 96 (a), the apportioning of damages permitted
by Civil Practice Act Section 97 (a), the availability of an application
under Section 98 for an extension of time even though the time has run
out, the "hip-pocket" filing system of Section 100 and the majestic
Article 9 (Sections 105-112) which so forthrightly deals with Mistakes,
Defects and Irregularities. Sections 110 (a) and 111 should be required
reading for every refresher course in New York Practice. And one of
the crowning glories of the Civil Practice Act is the series of sections
(112a, b, c, d, e, f, g and h) which so thoroughly jettisoned the techni-
calities of election of remedies, the distinction between mistake of fact
and mistake of law, and the necessity for physical tender in actions for
rescission or restitution.
Civil Practice Act Section 113 abolished the unjust doctrine of Low
75. Olker v. Salomone, 128 N.Y.L.J. 282, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1952).
76. Holtzoff, J., in Segal v. Travelers Ins. Co., 94 Fed. Supp. 123 (D.C. Dist. 1950).
77. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Lunn v. Andrews et at.,
268 N.Y. 538, 198 N.E. 393 (1935); Mleaney v. Keating, 200 Misc. 308, 102 N.Y.S.2d 514
(Sup. CL 1951), af'd, - App. Div. -, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 240 (2d Dep't 1952); O ino v. Black
et al., 278 App. Div. 146, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 82 (1st Dep't 1951). As this note is written,
the Meaney case is awaiting decision by the Court of Appeals. The Ogino case was
affirmed in a per curiam opinion handed down by the Court of Appeals, December 9, 1952.
Another case, Doca v. Federal Stevedoring Co. Inc., is en route to the Court of Appeals
from the Appellate Division, Second Department, - App. Div. -, 116 N.Y.S.2d 25
(2d Dep't 1952), reversing on other grounds, - Misc. -, - N.Y.S. 2d - (unreported).
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et al. v. Bankers Trust Co. et al.,"8 which held that a motion is not "made"
until it is returnable in court. The contrary is now the law, and a motion
is "made" when the notice of motion or order to show cause is duly
served.
Sections 132 and 66 of the Civil Practice Act providing that an ex parte
order may be reviewed by the Appellate Division or one of its justices
(upon motion papers without a formal appeal) became living things for
me after I read a study of them prepared by my good friend and former
student Mr. Leonard Feldman."o He cites one case which appears to
indicate that after adversaries have appeared on notice before a justice
at Special Term and procured a ruling from him, and thereafter one of
the counsel goes back into chambers, and procures a repetition of the
ruling (but now ex parte) such ex parte, though repetitious, ruling may
be reviewed upon application to the Appellate Division under Sections
66 and 132.80
Rulings at Special Term, Part II, upon objections made in examination
before trial are not appealable."1 Apparently they are not even reviewable
under Section 132 or under Civil Practice Act Section 66, for public
policy reasons against "flooding" the Appellate Division. If such rulings
sustain your adversary's objection you may move at Special Term, Part I,
either (1) to resettle the order of examination82 or (2) to reopen the
examination for the purpose of permitting questions to be answered. 3
If the Special II rulings overrule your objection, then either move to
resettle the order to make it clear that it was not intended that such a
question be answered, or let the witness answer and move at Special
Term, Part I, to suppress the deposition," lest you be deemed to have
waived your objection.85 Mr. Justice Walter soundly infers in the Gott-
frieds8 case that an order denying a motion to suppress enables the point
"to get to the Appellate Division" without "some very cumbersome and
circuitous procedure of getting it up as an incident of an appeal from a
final judgment." On the other hand, there is law to the effect that an
78. 265 N.Y. 264, 192 N.E. 406 (1934).
79. 127 N.Y.L.J. 1286, 1306, 1328 (editorials, Apr. 1, 2, 3, 1952).
80. Application of New Rochelle Trust Co., 273 App. Div. 1030, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 210
(2d Dep't 1948).
81. Dworkow v. Bachrack et al., 274 App. Div. 1057, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 214 (2d Dep't 1949)
and cases cited therein; Oppenheimer v. Duophoto Corp., 271 App. Div. 1005, 69 N.Y.S. 2d
309 (1st Dep't 1947).
82. Le Blanc et al. v. Duncan et al., 260 App Div. 953, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 648 (2d Dep't
1940).
83. Kogel et al. v. Trump et al., 271 App. Div. 890, 66 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (2d Dcp't 1946).
84. Gottfried et al. v. Gottfried et al., 197 Misc. 562, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
85. Sturm v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 63 N.Y. 77, 87 (1875).
86. See note 84 supra.
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order denying a motion to suppress is not appealable8
7
I hope that the Judicial Council will do something to help the lawyer
whose objection to the disclosure of trade secrets in examination before
trial is overruled. He may urge upon the court the thought that there
being no contumacity but rather a sincere effort to protect a legal right,
the court in its discretion may properly enter an appealable order, as
suggested by the dictum in Harrison v. Miller et al.1 If this is not done,
he definitely cannot appeal, under the Oppenheimer and Dworkow cases.!"
For him to disclose, move to suppress, and then win is small comfort
once the secret is out of the bag. And if the motion to suppress is denied
there is doubt as to the appealability of the order of denial. This doubt
should be removed?'
Last year the Judicial Council sponsored an excellent amendment to
Section 132. Presiding Justice Peck was in Europe and a lawyer seeking
to invoke Section 132 found that under the section as it then read only
the court or the presiding justice could act. A letter was written to the
Judicial Council that "there ought to be a law." Chapter 161 of the
New York Laws of 1951 eventuated, after a careful study, allowing action
by any Appellate Division justicef 1
Another important "trend" sponsored by the Judicial Council is Section
163 (a), which permits deposit in "any" post office depository, such as a
mail box, to comply with a mailing statute 2 In Mandel v. Brodskyp a
judgment obtained fourteen'years earlier was set aside because the order
permitting substituted service provided for deposit of a copy of the sum-
mons in a mail box rather than in a general or branch post office. It is
thoroughly understandable why Mr. Justice Carlin stated in his opinion
that "the Court reluctantly so holds."
Section 192 of the Civil Practice Act provides that no action or special
proceeding shall be defeated by the non-joinder or misjoinder of parties
except as provided in Section 193. This language induced an interesting
observation by Judge Finch in Cohen v. Dana et al.04 In that case a
stockholders' derivative action was instituted against directors for al-
leged misconduct to the detriment of a dissolved corporation. It was
87. Wallach v. Siegelson et al., 105 N.Y.S. 2d 35, 36 (Ist Dep't 1951).
88. 190 App. Div. 184, 179 N.Y. Supp. 331 (1st Dep't 1919).
89. See note 81 supra.
90. Cf. Drake v. Herman et a., 261 N.Y. 414, 185 N.E. 685 (1933); Hyman et al. v.
Revlon Products Corp. et al., 277 App. Div. 1118, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 937 (2d Dep't 1950);
Gehm v. Countess Moritza Cosmetic Co. et al., 196 Misc. 785, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 754 (Sup. Ct.
1949).
91. Seventeenth Report J.C. 74 (1951).
92. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 554.
93. 199 Misc. 8, 102 N.Y. S. 2d 555 (N. Y. City Ct. 1950).
94. 287 N.Y. 405, 40 N.E.2d 227 (1942).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
impossible to serve the corporation with a summons in New York. At
the end of his opinion Judge Finch stated: "It may become necessary
to consider also to what extent the statutory direction is applicable that
no action shall be defeated by the non-joinder of parties. Civil Practice
Act Section 192." Consider with this suggestion the doctrine of Keene
et al. v. Chambers et al., 5 to the effect that when an indispensable party
is outside the jurisdiction his or its presence in the action may be
dispensed with.
Section 193 defines indispensable and conditionally necessary parties.
In a nutshell, indispensable parties are defined as persons "whose ab-
sence will prevent an effective determination of the controversy or whose
interests are not severable and would be inequitably affected by a judg-
ment rendered between the parties before the court." An example of an
indispensable party is a joint obligee on a contract. A conditionally neces-
sary party is a party who is not indispensable but one who "ought to be
a party if complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties."
A partial assignee is a good example of a conditionally necessary party.
All other parties are proper parties, as for example, joint tortfeasors who
are liable jointly and severally. In the case of proper parties, of course,
the plaintiff has the option to sue one, any, or all.
A whole treatise could be written on Section 193 (a), dealing with
"Third-party practice." The principal function of this statute is to
abolish the rule of Nichols et al. v. Clark, MacMullen and Riley, Inc.
et al." It is now squarely provided by statute that a "claim over" need
not arise out of the same cause of action or the same ground as the claim
asserted against the third-party plaintiff by the plaintiff in that action.
A great body of law is growing up under this section in tort cases.
The fulcrum of the discussion is the decision in Fox v. Western New York
Motor Lines, Inc. et al. 7 to the effect that a joint tortfeasor cannot
bring another joint tortfeasor into an action unless there is a liability
over "by contract or status." If A sues B in tort alleging that B was
actively negligent, B, may not claim over against C, a joint tortfeasor,
because if both parties are in pari delicto there can be no contribution
between them and no "claim over" of any kind under the Fox doctrine."8
95. 271 N.Y. 326, 3 N.E.2d 443 (1936).
96. 261 N.Y. 118, 184 N.E. 729 (1933).
97. 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931).
98. Middleton v. City of New York, 300 N.Y. 732, 92 N.E. 2d 312 (1950), affirming,
276 App. Div. 780, 92 N.Y. S. 2d 656 (2d Dep't 1949); Schwartz et al. v. Merola el al.,
290 N.Y. 145, 156, 48 N.E.2d 299, 304 (1943) (no contract of indemnity; secondary
wrongdoer allowed to claim over upon common law principles) ; Iacono v. Frank Contract-
ing Co. et al., 259 N.Y. 377, 381, 382, 182 N.E. 23, 24 (1932) (no duty resting upon an
owner to inspect the machinery or tools furnished by a subcontractor); Phoenix Bridge
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If the theory of the plaintiff's complaint is such that when A sues B
the plaintiff may recover from B on the theory of either B's active
negligence or B's passive negligence, then B may bring in C as a third-
party under Section 193 (a) because it may be that on the trial the jury
will find that B's liability to A arose solely out of passive negligencefv
Further, while an act of omission may be "active" negligence, it may be
so tiny that the "disparity of facts" induces the court to regard it as
de minirnis.'°
A few additional commentaries on Section 193 (a) and Rule 54:
Impleader is accomplished according to the statute by service by
a defendant of a summons and verified complaint. He needs no order of
a court or judge permitting this, the practice being in this respect
comparable to the assertion of a counterclaim under Civil Practice Act
Section 271. Two judgments in the one action are permitted. The third-
party defendant may assert against the plaintiff defenses of the third-party
plaintiff, thus to this extent taking the defense "strategy" away from
the defendant. The third-party defendant may also counterclaim against
the plaintiff if the complaint in the action is amended to assert a claim
against such third-party defendant. And once the third-party defendant
has appeared, the plaintiff in the action may move to dismiss the third-
party complaint. Further, the third-party defendant may bring in a
fourth or fifth party. Similarly, a plaintiff, if counterclaimed against,
may himself bring in a third-party defendant. Rule 54 makes it clear
that any third-party "action" is an "action-within-an-action," which must
be started by the service of at least four papers, viz., the third-party
summons, the verified third-party complaint, the complaint of the plaintiff
and defendant's answer thereto. There is one answer to two complaints,
but apparently there is no penalty for the failure of the third-party
Co. v. Creem, 185 N.Y. 580, 78 N.E. 1110 (1906), affirming, 102 App. Div. 354, 92 N.Y.
Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1905); Coughlin v. Bisceglia & Sons, Inc., et al., 100 N.Y.S.2d 738
(Sup. Ct. 1950) (complaint based solely on active negligence; third-party complaint not
based on right to indemnification. Third-party complaint dismissed). In one interesting
case, Tipaldi v. Riverside Memorial Chapel, Inc., et al., 298 N.Y. 6S6, 82 N.E.2d 585
(1948), affirming, 273 App. Div. 414, 78 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't), a plaintiff sued tvwo
passive "wrongdoers," an owner and a general contractor. The court found them not in pa
ddicto, and held that the general contractor must indemnify the owner on the basis of the
"relative delinquency" of the parties. Cf. Logan v. Bee Builders, 277 App. Div. 1040, 100
N.Y.S.2d 483 (2d Dep't 1950) and Foreman v. Udell, 267 App. Div. 823, 45 N.Y.S.2d
813 (2d Dep't 1944).
99. Cf. Shass v. Abgold, 277 App. Div. 346, 100 N.Y.S.2d 121 (2d Dep't 1950); Bonn
v. Jacob Kotler Co., 107 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. CL 1951) (all defendants joint tortfeasors
in par delicto. Claim over under N.Y. Civ. P Ac. AcT § 264 not allowed); Fugni v.
Lanning, 196 Misc. 335, 92 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
100. McFall v. Campagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E. 2d 463 (1952).
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defendant to answer plaintiff's complaint, which, however, he is expected
and required to answer.
A distinction between Section 193(a) and Section 264 is apparent
from the decision in Deneau v. Beatty et al. 0-1 There a defendant success-
fully asserted against his co-defendant under Section 264 an affirmative
claim for his own damages. This cannot be done under Section 193 (a).1'
An unusual case is Clark v. Halstead,03 in which, in an "A der v. Blau"
situation, the defendant tortfeasor was permitted to bring in a malpractis-
ing physician under Section 193(a), on the theory of subrogation. The
court indicates that if there is. an $11,000 verdict for plaintiff, the jury
may determine the percentage of the $11,000 which is represented by
the aggravation of the injury by the physician's malpractice. 04 This
principle is to be viewed as a trend away from the established doctrine
that a jury ordinarily may not apportion damage among joint tortfeasors
liable on the same cause of action.' Another such "trend away" is found
in libel cases 06 and in cases involving possessory estates. 0 7
Incidentally, the doctrine of Ader v. Blau' 8 has been removed from
our law, root and branch. It had held that despite the "unifying center"
of the death of a single human being, a cause of action against a fence-
owner for negligence in maintaining the fence could not be joined with
a cause of action against a physician whose malpractice contributed to
the same death, inasmuch as the two causes of action, forsooth, were
not "connected with the same subject of action." The case might have
been distinguished by the plaintiff's specific allegations that each of the
two acts was the "sole" cause of death. It was severely criticized for
conceiving a "cause of action" in terms of legal right rather than factual
events.'09 In any event, the doctrine of Ader v. Blau has passed from
obscurity to oblivion by the amendment of Civil Practice Act Section
258 and by such decisions as Great Northern Tel. Co. v. Yokohama Specie
101. 195 Misc. 649, 91 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
102. Victory v. Miller, 198 Misc. 196, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
103. 276 App. Div. 17, 93 N.Y. S. 2d 49 (3d Dep't 1949).
104. See Note, 49 MIcii. L. Rav. 292 (1950).
105. Klepper v. Seymour House Corp. et al., 246 N.Y. 85, 158 N.E. 29 (1927); Polsey
v. Waldorf-Astoria, 216 App. Div. 86, 214 N.Y.Supp. 600 (Ist Dcp't 1926), appeal
dismissed, 243 N.Y. 533, 154 N.E. 602 (1926). Cf. Sherlock v. Manwaren, 208 App. Dlv.
538, 203 N.Y.Supp. 709 (4th Dep't 1924).
106. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 97(a).
107. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 193 (c).
108. 241 N.Y. 7, 148 N.E. 771 (1925).
109. CL.aK, CODE PLEADMnG 448-9 (2d ed. 1947). Cf. Hum et al. v. Oursler et al.,
289 U.S. 238 (1932); Dioguardia v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); Abrams v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 300 N.Y. 80, 89 N.E.2d 235 (1949).
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Bank Ltd. et al,"10 and Ike v. Ikle."' Both causes of action may today
be joined, apparently even if pleaded in inconsistent fashion by repeated
use of the word "solely."1 2
In passing, I suggest to the Judicial Council that with Section 258
permitting joinder of inconsistent causes of action in a complaint, the
time has come for a re-examination of the doctrine of "departure" of a
reply from the theory of the complaint. 3 If a plaintiff may be incon-
sistent with himself in his own complaint, why must his reply set forth
new matter "not inconsistent with the complaint?" The time appears to
be at hand for excision of the quoted language from Section 272.PI
A word, in passing also, about Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors.
Section 211(a) permits contribution only where plaintiff has joined
joint tortfeasors as defendants and recovered judgment against them
jointly and one of them has paid more than his "pro rata share." In
nine jurisdiction statutes have been enacted providing for a right of
contribution among joint tortfeasors which is not dependent upon the
whim of the plaintiff as to whom he will sue.n" Three states have
established the right by decisional law. n" The right exists in admiralty.
And the District of Columbia has established it by construction of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a). In addition, the Supreme Court
of the United States has held that the Federal Tort Claims Act gives
sovereign consent of the United States to be sued for contribution either
in a separate action or by way of third-party procedure. 7 Despite this
"background", and whether or not there is a trend in the direction of
110. 297 N.Y. 135, 76 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
111. 257 App. Div. 635, 14 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1st Dep't 1939). For a remarkable pre-
Ikie law review article, see Election of Remedies: A Delusion?, 38 CoL. L. Rm,. 292 (1938).
112. But see the following cases as to inconsistent allegations which are "mutually
destructive": Condon v. Associated Hospital Service et al., 287 N.Y. 411, 415, 40 N.E. 2d
230, 232 (1942); Olsen et al. v. Bankers Trust Co., 205 App. Div. 669, 199 N.Y. Supp.
700 (1st Dep't 1923) ; Herman v. First Merrick Corp. et al., 99 N.Y. S. 2d 119 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
113. N.Y. Crv. PpAc. AcT § 272.
114. Cf. Rosen v. Rosen, 267 App. Div. 770, 45 N.Y. S.2d 216 (2d Dep't 1943).
115. Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, South Dakota.
116. Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin.
117. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). The reasoning against
contribution is that it allows defendants who could distribute the loss over society "to
cast it back instead onto the shoulders of individuals who cannot distribute it at all."
James, Contribution Among Joint Tort Feasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARv. L. Rm,.
1156 (1941). I prefer the contrary rationale of Gregory, Defense, 54 HAnv. L. Ray. 1170
(1941) and of such authorities as George's Radio Inc. v. Capital Transit Cd., 126 F.2d 219
(D. C. Cir. 1942) ; PRosseR, TORTs, llU (1941) ; and 1 CoOLEY, TonTs, 297, 298 (4th ed.
1932).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
finding a right of complete indemnity in favor of a passive tortfeasor," 8
a contribution bill introduced in the New York Legislature of 1952 failed
of passage." 9
DECORUM AT AND NEAR COURTROOMS
1. Picketing
Picketing within 200 feet of a courthouse in disorderly fashion or
with reference to the character of a court or jury therein or commenting
upon the conduct of a trial therein is made a criminal contempt of court
under an amendment to Section 600 of the Penal Law effective July 1,
1952.120
2. Televising of Court and Other Proceedings
The televising, broadcasting or taking of motion pictures within New
York State of "proceedings" in which the testimony of witnesses by
subpoena or other compulsory process is or may be taken is now a
misdemeanor, whether the "proceedings" are conducted by a court, com-
mission, committee, administrative agency or other tribunal. 12'
In passing, it may be noted that a Temporary State Confmission on
the use of Television for Educational Purposes has been created. 22
PROCESS
A Supreme Court summons must state the county in which plaintiff
resides."
The granting of a provisional remedy is deemed the commencement of
an action.'2
Partners may sue or be sued in their partnership name. 25
In actions or proceedings against a public body or officer it is now
permissible merely to name the body or officer without naming the
individual incumbents of such public office, body, board, commission or
agency.120
In an accounting proceeding in the Surrogate's Court it will be no longer
necessary to cite any infant or incompetent whose legacy in a fixed
118. N.Y. LF. Doc. No. 65H (1952).
119. N.Y. Leg. Index 6 (Sen. Int. 42, Assembly Int., 1952).
120. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 669.
121. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 241, amending N.Y. Civ. Ricrns LAw by adding a new
section 52.
122. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 479.
123. Rule 45, N.Y. Sup. Ct.
124. Arnold v. Mayal Realty Co., 299 N. Y. 57, 85 N. E. 2d 616 (1949); Scbram v.
Keane, 279 N.Y. 227, 18 N.E.2d 136 (1938).
125. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 22(a). Cf. N.Y. Civ. Pwic. ACT §§ 1197, 1198.
126. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 481, adding new N.Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 262.
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amount of $500 or less was paid to his parent or to a competent person
with whom he resides, or who has some interest in his welfare pursuant
to an order under Section 271 of the Surrogate's Court Act.' -
An unincorporated association is regarded as an entity for the purpose
of permitting suits by it for libel.128 But an unincorporated labor union
may not be sued in tort.' -
And its members, who did not authorize the union's tort, may not be
sued individually.130
Persons are not "parties" just because "named" in a summons. They
are not parties until process has been served. 3
Service of a thirty day landlord-tenant notice on Sunday is void.' 2
For a foreign corporation to be deemed to be "doing business" here,
"continuity of action from a permanent locale is essential2 '1
Section 227 (a) of the Civil Practice Act is novel. A non-resident who
sues here is deemed to designate his attorney as his agent to receive
process, during the pendency of the action, in any New York court,
"provided the cause of action or claim is one which could have been
interposed by way of counterclaim had the action of proceeding been
brought in the Supreme Court."'134
Section 229(b), entitled "Service of summons on nonresident natural
person doing business in this state" is now pretty well understood,1'c
and it has been held constitutional' 3 However, a labor union or an un-
incorporated association is not a "natural person" and thus not subject
to it' 37
Substituted service, service by publication, and service outside the
state without an order are passed over here because the entire subject
127. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 348, amending N.Y. Suan. CT. AcT § 262.
128. Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers Inc., 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E. 2d 919 (1942).
129. Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 6S3 (1951).
130. Ibid.
131. Emmons v. Hirschberger, 270 App. Div. 1025, 63 N.Y.S.2d 43 (2d Dep't 1946);
Bennett v. Bird, 237 App. Div. 542, 261 N.Y. Supp. 540 (2d Dep't 1933).
132. Di Perna et al. v. Black, 187 Misc. 437, 62 N.Y. S. 2d 69 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
133. Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Dist. Co., 299 N.Y. 208, 209, 86 N.E. 2d
564 (1949). Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington et al., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
134. See EPoRT or nmH NEW YoRR STATE LAW REvISION Coms2.SixN, LEG. Doc. No.
65 B (1949); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); Frank L. Young Co. v. Mc,'Neal-
Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398 (1931).
135. See LEG. Doc. No. 65 D (1940); No. 65 N (1941); Yeckes-Eichenbaum Inc. v.
McCarthy, 290 N.Y. 437, 49 N.E.2d 517 (1943).
136. Interchemical Corp. v. Mirabelli et al., 269 App. Div. 224, S4 N.Y.S.2d 522
(1st Dep't 1945). Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington et al, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S.
289 (1919); 28 Y=rn L. J. 512 (1919).
137. Amon v. Moreschi, 296 N.Y. 395, 73 N.E.2d 716 (1947).
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matter is charted in a detailed diagrammatic summary which was
published in the Fordham Law Review under the title "Constructive
Service of Process in New York."' 33
Outstanding recent cases on the subject hold that in personam jurisdic-
tion is acquired over New York domiciliaries who are served outside the
state without an order and without an attachment;'l that in equity
actions service by publication upon a New York domiciliary results in
in personam jurisdiction; 40 that in in ren equity actions service by
publication is valid even against a nonresident, and of course, without
an attachment, since there is no attachment in equity cases;14" that in
matrimonial actions sequestration may occur at any time before judg-
ment and even after the order of publication is signed;' 42 that the
provisional remedy of attachment is available against "colossus corpora-
tions" present in New York even where plaintiff's claim arose entirely
outside New Yoik; 43 and that the Supreme Court has power to enjoin a
resident of New York from departing to a foreign jurisdiction to institute
a matrimonial action there.4
An extraordinary matrimonial case is Johnson v. Muelberger4" in
which the Supreme Court reversed a unanimous New York Court of
Appeals. 46
Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover Bank'47 presents a thought-provok-
ing puzzle, since it has been said that "you can't legislate a debt into a
res," and that that is why we have the complicated interpleader schemes
found in Civil Practice Act Sections 287(a-i) and 51(a). On the face
of the opinion in the Feuchtwanger case it could be argued that the court
judicially legislated a debt into a res for service-by-publication purposes
and held that "an intangible res is so far capable of explicit designation
as to be specific personal property within the meaning of Civil Practice
Act Section 232.2'" If this were true, then although ordinary inter-
138. 18 FoRD. L. REv. 244 (1949).
139. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-3 (1940) ; Fifteenth Report J. C. 60-2 (1949).
Cf. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 520.
140. Dirksen v. Dirksen, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Cf. N.Y. Civ. PaAc. Acr
§ 520.
141. Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. et al., 288 N.Y. 342, 43
N.E. 2d 434 (1942); Garfein v. McInnis, 248 N.Y. 261, 162 N.E. 73 (1928).
142. Geary v. Geary, 272 N.Y. 390, 6 N.E. 2d 67 (1936). Cf. Dimnerling v. Andrews
et a!., 236 N.Y. 43, 139 N. E. 774 (1923).
143. Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Gunning et al., 295 N.Y. 324, 67 N.E. 2d 510 (1946).
144. Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951), reversing, Goldstein v
Goldstein, 283 N.Y. 146, 27 N.E.2d 969 (1940).
145. 340 U.S. 581 (1951). See also, Cook v. Cook, - U.S. - (1952).
146. In re Johnson's Estate, 301 N.Y. 13, 92 N.E. 2d 44 (1950).
147. 288 N.Y. 342, 43 N.E.2d 434 (1942).
148. Id. at 345, 43 N. E. 2d at 435. (Italics added).
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pleader is in personam, and service by publication is not possible in
connection with it.49 The adroit pleader who fashioned his "cause of
action" into one in rem by transforming a simple creditor-debtor cause of
action against a bank into an "action to impress a trust" upon the bank
account would enable the bank to achieve valid interpleader jurisdiction
based upon service by publication. My good friend, Mr. William Harvey
Reeves, who specializes in such matters, insists that the Feichtwanger
case is to be carefully limited to the facts revealed in its Record on
Appeal, viz., to a situation in which there was truly a specific res and not
a mere debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its customer.
APPEARANCE
A corporation must appear in an action by an attorney.'o
A foreign ambassador who has not waived sovereign immunity is quite
immune from suit even if he appears.'r'
The doctrine of Muslusky v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.,'2 has been
abolished by amendment of Civil Practice Act Section 257.
The whole field of Special Appearance has been reworked and re-
vamped. First, Rule 106(1) and Rule 107(1), permitting motions to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the person of defendant, have been
rescinded and the rules renumbered."5 3 Second, out of a Fordham Law
Review article0 and a study by the Judicial Council'5 has come new
Section 237(a) of the Civil Practice Act, which is best explained by the
following excerpt from three paragraphs of the 1951 (Seventeenth)
Report of the Judicial Council, at page 58 thereof:
"Although a special appearance has been permitted in New York for over
100 years, there is at present no statute or rule permitting or regulating such
appearance.
"For some problems confronting the New York attorney, no solution is to
be found in the cases. The outstanding example is that involving nonresidents
149. Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326, 130 N.E. 566 (1921).
150. N.Y. Civ. Prc. ACT § 236.
151. 62 STAT. 927, 28 U.S.C. 1251 (1948); Friedberg et al. v. Santa Cruz et al, 274
App. Div. 1072, 86 N.Y. S. 2d 369 (2d Dep't 1949); De Simone v. Transportes Mlartimos
do Estado, 200 App. Div. 82, 191 N.Y. Supp. 864 (1st Dep't 1922). Cf. Herman el al.
v. Apetz et a., 130 Msc. 618, 224 N.Y. Supp. 389 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
152. 225 N.Y. 584, 122 N.E. 461 (1919).
153. Effective September 1, 1951. See 126 N.Y.L.J. 383, col. 3 (Sept. 6, 1951).
154. Framer and Graziano, Jurisdictional Dilemma of the Non.resident Deferdant in
New York, 19 FoRD. L. Rnv. 125 (1950). Cf. Brainard v. Brainard, 272 App. Div. 575,
74 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd on other grounds, 297 N.Y. 916, 79 X.E.2d
744 (1948).
155. Fifteenth Report J.C. 62 (1949); Sixteenth Report J.C. 66-9, 185-217 (1950);
Seventeenth Report J. C. 58-64 (1951).
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against whom in rem and in personam claims have been stated in one complaint,
with the court having jurisdiction in rem, but not, allegedly, jurisdiction in
personam. It has been repeatedly held in such a situation that a motion to
vacate the service of process will not prevail. The defendant must raise his
objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person by motion, but precisely
what motion he is to make in such a situation has not been indicated.
"Once it is agreed that it is desirable to permit a defendant to come into
court to object to its jurisdiction over his person (and, as herein recommended,
over the subject matter) without thereby submitting his person to the court's
jurisdiction for all purposes, a simple, direct, and clear-cut statement of the
procedure to be followed in making such an appearance should be at hand.
The books are replete with evidence that it is not."
Hence the new Section 237(a). The objection of lack of jurisdiction
of the person "must" be raised by a motion to set aside service of process
or to strike out part of the complaint. Otherwise it "shall be deemed
waived." No objection to the merits may be joined with it, either,
except an objection that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.
If the motion is denied, defendant may litigate the merits without waiving
the objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person.
PLEADING
It is significant that not only is there a statutory mandate for liberal
construction of the Civil Practice Act in Section 2, but that there is a
double mandate for liberality in pleading, since pleadings "must be
liberally construed."'5 6
Hence, although a cause of action by a salesman for the unknown
balance of his commissions, in the sum of "at least" $12,000, is a cause of
action at law, and not one in equity for an accounting, a complaint for
an accounting will not be dismissed after answer. Rather the action will
be transferred for trial from Special Term to Trial Term.5 '
Causes of action may be pleaded in the alternative, whether or not
there is doubt as to "who" is liable.'
Section 265 of the Civil Practice Act has been repealed, but only
because repetitious of Decedent's Estate Law Section 131. Hence in a
death action the burden of pleading and proving the contributory
negligence of the decedent is still on the defendant."' In a proper case,
such a defendant may even have to provide a bill of particulars of the
defense. 6°
156. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 275.
157. Terner v. Glickstein & Terner Inc., 288 N.Y. 299, 28 N.E. 2d 846 (1940) ; Casey
v. Nye Odorless Incinerator Corp., 238 App. Div. 242, 264 N.Y. Supp. 207 (1st Dep't 1933).
158. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 258.
159. N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 131.
160. McGann v. Adler, 241 App. Div. 726, 270 N.Y. Supp. 915 (1st Dep't 1934)
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In the average negligence action, despite an occasional dictum to the
contrary," I think that the better view is that although the plaintiff
must prove his freedom from contributory negligence, he need not plead
it. 1 6 2
If a plaintiff sues in his own right and not as assignee, the defendant
may go out and "buy up" a claim against plaintiff for the express purpose
of counterclaiming it." This is not so if plaintiff is an assignee.' t
Parallel claims are not counterclaims.'s
A recent case, to my consternation, has allowed a reply to a reply c0
I trust that this is not a trend back to the seven pleadings of the common
law 67
MOTION PRACTICE
I need say-little about Motion Practice, since Mr. Samuel S. Tripp,
former President of the Queens County Bar Association, has so ably
summarized the topic in his excellent Guide to Motion Practice, the 1951-
1952 Supplement which I find terse, readable and invaluable.
The necessity for many cross-motions is disappearinges and much of the
doctrine of Bernard v. Chase National Bank00 has been discarded from
our procedure. But cross-motions have not been abolished."'
Here is a problem: Suppose an action upon an oral contract for the
sale of land. The vulnerability of the complaint because of the Statute of
Frauds is apparent on the face of the pleading. Rule 107 permits a
motion whether the defect appears on the face or not. Suppose the motion
is not made, and defendant desires to plead the Statute of Frauds. Has
he waived the objection by failing to move against the objection appearing
(plaintiff unfamiliar with facts. Bill allowed). Cf. Egan v. Tishman & Sons Inc., 222
App. Div. 141, 144, 225 N.Y.Supp. 631, 634 (1st Dep't 1927) (plaintiff familiar with the
facts. Bill denied).
161. Rafferty v. State of New York, 172 Misc. 870, 16 N.Y. S. 2d 6S5 (Ct. C1. 1939).
162. Lee v. Troy Citizens' Gaslight Co., 98 N.Y. 115, 119 (1885); Klein v. Burleson,
138 App. Div. 405, 122 N.Y. Supp. 752 (4th Dep't 1910). Cf. Rafferty v. State of New
York, 261 App. Div. 80, 24 N.Y. S. 2d 689 (3d Dep't 1940), affirming, 172 Misc. 870, 16
N.Y.S. 2d 685 (Ct. Cl. 1939); Zaepfel v. Parmass, 140 Misc. 539, 250 N.Y.Supp. 740
(Sup. Ct. 1931).
163. Scientific, etc. Corp. v. Board of Education, 172 Misc. 770, 16 N.Y.S.2d 91
(N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1939) ; Bricken Constr. Corp. v. Cushman, 163 Misc. 371, 297 N.Y.Supp.
194 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
164. N.Y. Cirv. PRAC. AcT § 267.
165. Binon v. Boel et al., 271 App. Div. 505, 66 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1st Dep't 1946).
166. Rosner v. Globe Valve Corp., 276 App. Div. 462, 95 N.Y. S. 2d 531 (Ist Dep't 1950).
167. Declaration, plea, replication, rejoinder, surrejoinder, rebutter, surrebutter. CuMtoDy,
iALeuAL Or NEw YORx Cim PRAcTiCE 317 (1946).
168. Ruims Civ. PRAc. 109 (6), 112, 113.
169. 233 App. Div. 384, 253 N.Y.Supp. 336 (1st Dep't 1931).
170. N.Y. Clv. PRAc. AcT § 117.
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on the face? Civil Practice Act Sections 278, 279, 280 do not mention
the Statute of Frauds, and the "waiver rule" of Gentilala v. Fay Taxi-
cabs Inc. 71 is not clearly applicable. Perhaps, a more comprehensive
"waiver rule" should be worked out by statute, rule of civil practice,
or case, in order to clarify the subject.
Rule 113 requires an evidentiary "affidavit." Would a deposition do?
Civil Practice Act Sections 303 and 307 and Rule 120 permit the use
of a deposition upon a motion. But conflicting cases say that a deposition
is an affidavit,'73 and that it is not an affidavit." 4 This should be clarified
and Rule 113 should be amended to permit the use of a deposition if an
affidavit is not practicable.
A counterclaim may be striken out as sham under Rule 103.116
A negligence bill of particulars must always be verified. 7' And a
bill of particulars, while not a pleading, may nevertheless be used upon
a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 112. Indeed, there
are at least two cases that permit use of an affidavit upon a Rule 112
motion, not to adjudicate issues, but to show the existence of issues of
fact, such as the tolling of the statute of limitations.'
Another interesting motion rule is Rule 65. A moving party need not
serve copies of papers which are in the possession of his adversary. A
notice to produce upon the motion, moreover, may be served with the
motion papers. Under this rule, if the opposition's income is material in
the litigation, he can be compelled to produce his retained copies of his
Income Tax Returns. 78 Indeed, the late Mr. Justice Shientag, of blessed
memory, wrote in Leonard v. Wargon et al., 7 ' that:
171. 214 App. Div. 255, 212 N.Y. Supp. 101 (1st Dep't 1925), rev'd on other grounds,
243 N.Y. 397, 153 N.E. 848 (1926).
172. Cf. Brauer v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 178 N.Y. 339, 343-4, 70 N. E. 863,
865 (1904); and Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp. et al., 195 Misc. 710, 91 N.Y. S. 2d
73 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
173. Wallace v. Baring et al., 2 App. Div. 501, 37 N.Y. Supp. 1078 (1st Dep't 1896);
McQuade v. Prudential Ins. Co., 166 Misc. 524, 2 N.Y. S. 2d 647 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1938).
174. Zinner -et al. v. Louis Meyers & Son Inc., 181 Misc. 344, 43 N.Y. S. 2d 319 (Sup.
Ct. 1943).
175. Gould v. Parker, 122 N.Y.L.J. 1378, col. 3 (N.Y. City Ct. Nov. 25, 1949). Cf.
Esteves v. Swobodzien, 195 Misc. 956, 90 N.Y. S. 2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
176. RuLEs Crv. PRAc. 117.
177. Chance et al. v. Guaranty Trust Co. et al., 256 App. Div. 840, 9 N.Y. S. 2d 478,
480 (2d Dep't 1939); Union Equities Inc. v. Silk et al., 73 N. Y. S. 2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
178. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Tar Asphalt Trucking Co., et al., 30 Fed. Supp. 216
(D. C.N.J. 1939) ; Ocean A & G Ltd. v. Marcus Contr. Co., 234 N.Y. Supp. 854 (1st Dep't
1929); Schacht v. Schacht, 58 N.Y. S. 2d 54, 62 (N.Y. Doam. Rel. Ct. 1945); Leonard v.
Wargon et al., 55 N.Y. S. 2d 626 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Cf. Bishop v. Bishop, 195 Misc. 183,
91 N.Y. S. 2d 207 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (deposition of husband's employer as to husband's
earnings).
179. 55 N.Y. S. 2d 626 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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"There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U. S. C. A.) which
confers upon a judgment debtor any privilege against disclosure by him of the
contents of such returns."
EXAmrNATIONS BEFORE TRIAL AND DEPosITIoNs
The great gift of 1952 to deposition practice was a new Rule X of the
Trial Term Rules of New York County which is numbered Rule XIX in
Bronx County, followed by new Rule 121(a), which became effective
on July 1, 1952, and which reads as follows:
"Rule 121 (a). Testimony by deposition in an action; notice. In any action,
at any time after the service of an answer, any party may cause to be taken
by deposition before trial, the testimony of any other party, his agent or
employee as prescribed by sections 288 and 289 of the Civil Practice Act,
regardless of the burden of proof.
"At least ten days' notice of such examination shall be served in accordance
with the provisions of section 290 of the Civil Practice Act. Notice of at least
five days may then be served by the party to be examined for the examination
of any other party, his agent or employee, such examination to be noticed for
and to follow at the same time and place.
"The notice of taking testimony by deposition shall contain the title of the
action and be subscribed with the name and address of the person giving the
same. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries or brought pursuant
to section 130 of the Decedent Estate Law, or to recover damages for an
injury to property brought in connection therewith, it shall be sufficient if,
as to matters upon which a person is to be examined, the notice shall state
'all of the relevant facts and circumstances in connection with the accident,
including negligence, contributory negligence, liability or damages.'"
The trend, of course, is toward the "wide open" practice of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, although New York is still sparing in its
authorization of examinations before trial of mere witnesses who are
not parties.
The "ice-breaker" in New York was Marie Dorros, Inc. v. Dorros
Bros. Inc. et al.,80 abolishing the need for the affirmative in commercial
litigations.
That was followed by Rule 129 (a), explicitly permitting cross-examina-
tion on examination before trial.
Now, Rule 121(a). It may readily be seen that law offices will be
busy, reporters will prosper, and that calendars may crumble. Such is the
trend that may cause our generation to go down in history as that of the
Golden Era of the conquering of the law's delay, even in a metropolis.
Under Section 288, the testimony may be taken of agents or employees
of partnerships and of individuals conducting business under their
180. 274 App. Div. 11, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 25 (1st Dep't 1948).
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own names or under trade or assumed names. Under Section 289, where
an action is against a corporation (e.g., Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit
Corp.), and the action is defended by a transferee or assignee (e.g., the
City of New York), the testimony may be taken (by order only, not by
notice) of any former officer, director, agent or employee of the transferor
corporation.
Under Section 300, a person to be examined may generally be compelled
to attend only in the county where he resides or has an office, and, if
a non-resident, only in a county in which he is served with a subpoena.
An order served upon him personally may otherwise direct. An order
served upon his attorney may only direct one other place, viz., the
county where the action is pending.
The general subject of. the use of books and records upon an examina-
tion before trial is usually dealt with by the motion judges by simply
citing Civil Practice Act Section 296 and Beeber v. Empire Power Corp. 8"
Section 296 is not too clear.
A subpoena duces tecum will bring a party's books to the examination.
It will not permit their use in evidence if they are not used by the party
to refresh his recollection.' 82 By order, however, the court may direct
otherwise.'83 It has even been suggested that the court can require a
witness to read from a book. 4 Now suppose that a party, whose books
have been subpoenaed, consults page 77 of this ledger to refresh his
recollection. Is page 77 for that reason admissible in evidence? No.
Even on a trial the mere fact that a witness uses a paper to refresh his
recollection does not make it admissible in evidence on that account.' 8,B
Now, upon an examination before trial, may the examiner inspect the
paper which the witness uses to refresh recollection? Apparently not,1
80
181. 260 App. Div. 68, 20 N.Y. S. 2d 784 (1st Dep't 1940).
182. Raleigh et al. v. City of New York, 264 App. Div. 776, 34 N.Y. S. 2d 685 (2d
Dep't 1942); Singer v. National Gum & Mica Co., 211 App. Div. 758, 208 N.Y. Supp. 1
(1st Dep't 1925); Redmond v. Stoneham et a., 182 App. Div. 307, 169 N.Y. Supp. 239
(1st Dep't 1918); Ortman v. Beiley, 160 App. Div. 258, 145 N.Y. Supp. 541 (1st Dep't
1914); Marsh v. Russeks Fifth Ave. Corp., 78 N.Y. S. 2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Dastis v.
Sydell Realty Corp., 76 N.Y.S. 2d 569 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
183. Beeber v. Empire Power Corp., et al., 260 App. Div. 68, 20 N.Y. S. 2d 784 (1st
Dep't 1940); Zeltner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 220 App. Div. 21, 220 N.Y. Supp. 356
(1st Dep't 1927).
184. Harrison v. Miller et al., 190 App. Div. 184, 179 N.Y. Supp. 331 (1st Dep't 1919).
185: Mattison v. Mattison, 203 N.Y. 79, 96 N.E. 359 (1911). Cf. Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Although see Bata et al. v. Chase Safe Deposit Co. el al.,
99 N. Y. S. 2d 535, 579 (1950).
186. Sasson et al. v. Lichtman et a!., 277 App. Div. 368, 100 N.Y. S. 2d 297 (1st Dep't
1950); Raleigh et al. v. City of New York, 264 App. Div. 776, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 685 (2d Dep't
1942); Michel Cosmetics Inc. v. Tsirkas et a., 251 App. Div. 742, 296 N.Y. Supp. 96
(2d Dep't 1937) ; Royce v. Ziegfeld, 224 App. Div. 651, 229 N.Y. Supp. 22 (2d Dep't
1928) ; Clark v. American Press Ass'n. et al., 166 Misc. 471, 2 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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even though upon a trial inspection is authorized to test credibility, e.g.,
to show that the paper could not honestly refresh recollection.18 7
The moral would appear to be (if the rules are not harmonized) to
procure an order combining examination before trial with discovery and
inspection. 8s
There is authority for the proposition that a witness who is not a
party to the action should not be required to produce any of his books
or papers. 189
A witness may make changes in his deposition before signing it, but
only if he makes it manifest whether he is challenging the accuracy of the
stenographer. 90
If a plaintiff examines a defendant before trial, and the defendant
appears at the trial but does not take the stand, the defendant may never-
theless read into evidence his own deposition, taken by plaintiff. 1"
Section 306(a), permitting blood-grouping tests to establish exclusion,
is of interest as the possible fore-runner, in civil cases, of the use of lie-
detector evidence. Lie detector evidence was once admitted19 - but later
excluded. 9 3 Dr. Joseph Kubis of Fordham University is continuing the
187. Matter of Hewett's Will, 271 App. Div. 1054, 70 N.Y. S. 2d 3 (4th Dep't 1947).
Assurance of offer in evidence, moreover, need not be given as a condition precedent to the
right to inspect. Miller v. Greenwald Petticoat Co., 192 App. Div. 559, 562, 183 N.Y. Supp.
97, 99 (lst Dep't 1920) ; Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201 (N.Y. 1870).
188. Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Hartstein et al., 256 App. Div. 917, 10 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1st Dep't 1939); Fey v. Wisser, 206 App. Div. 520, 202 N.Y.Supp. 30 (2d Dep't 1923);
In re Dimon's Estate, 155 Misc. 311, 280 N.Y. Supp. 526 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
189. Mauser v. Sclar, 278 App. Div. 661, 102 N.Y.S.2d 568 (2d Dep't 1951); Wilder-
muth v. Keating, 269 App. Div. 783, 55 N.Y. S. 2d 110 (2d Dep't 1945). Cf. Jaffe v. City
of New York, 196 Misc. 710, 94 N.Y. S. 2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
190. Columbia v. Lee et al., 239 App. Div. 849, 264 N.Y.Supp. 423 (2d Dep't 1933);
Van Son v. Herbst et al., 215 App. Div. 849, 264 N.Y.Supp. 272 (Ist Dep't 1926);
Harrison v. Miller et al., 190 App. Div. 184, 179 N.Y.Supp. 331 (Ist Dep't 1919); Hayes
v. City of New York, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 424 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Dworkow v. Bachrack, 193
Misc. 52, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Mansbach v. Klausner, 179 Misc. 952, 40
N.Y. S. 2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
191. Berdell v. Berdell, 86 N.Y. 519, 521, (1881); Goell v. United States Life Ins. Co.,
265 App. Div. 735, 40 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1st Dep't 1943); Redfield et al. v. National Petroleum
Corp., 211 App. Div. 152, 206 N.Y.Supp. 827 (1st Dep't 1924); N.Y. Cov. P Ac. AcT
§§ 303, 304.
192. People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens County Ct. 1938). See
Summers, Science Can Get the Confession, 8 FoRD. L. Rv. 334 (1939). Cf. Commissisoner
of Welfare v. Castonie, 277 App. Div. 90, 97 N.Y. S. 2d 804 (1st Dep't 1950).
193. People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (Kings County Ct. 1938). See
also People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 107 N.E.2d 595 (1952), where Desmond, J., observes
that lie detector evidence is not "yet" accepted by our courts. He also observes that the
court's investigation confirms the standard medical acceptance of "truth serum" tests
with sodium amytal. The results of such tests, however, are likewise not yet admissible in
evidence. See Note, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1292, 1310 (July 1952). Similarly, with other narcosis
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work of the late Father Walter Summers, S.J., with an electro-dermal
lie detector or "Pathometer." Other investigators are using "multipin"
instruments, such as the Keeler "Polygraph" and the Stoelting "Decepto-
graph," which simultaneously measure blood-pressure and respiratory
changes as well as electro-dermal resistance. Thd results are impressive
and in my opinion well warrant new test litigation seeking to give lie-
detector evidence in civil cases the status of fingerprint evidence in
criminal cases. 193' The possibilities of the lie detector in "pre-trial"
hearings are apparent, but not yet availed of~loa Recently, moreover,
and hypnosis results. Ibid. Cf. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 468 (1933);
Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W. 2d 593 (1949) ; People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98
N.E. 2d 533 (1951); People v. Esposito et al., 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E. 2d 925 (1942);
Fourteenth Report J.C. 266 (1948). For the history of lie-detector evidence, see INDAr,
LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1942); INBAU, SEL?-INcRnMNATION (1950);
IV WIGmORE, EvIDENCE § 2265 (2d ed. 1923).
193a. The only reported case on the admissibility of lie detector evidence in civil cases
is Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W. 2d 172 (1951). An ideal civil case for use of
the device is a case such as Garippa v. Wisotsky et al, 108 N.Y. S. 2d 67 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
aff'd, 280 App. Div. 807, 113 N.Y.2d 772 (2d Dept. 1952), in which a non-jury court
awarded a verdict of $75,194.25 in a "hit-run driver" case, where there were no eye-
witnesses whatever at 5:30 A.M. on a rainy morning. In that case Horn, the defendant's
driver, was placed upon the stand by plaintiff and swore that he never had any accident
whatever on the day in question, that he never passed any traffic lights, and that on three
occasions an "unknown man" accosted him and accused him (some days after the accident)
of being the "hit-run driver," whereupon the "unknown man" disappeared. The learned
trial court's opinion states, that "Horn's story of his encounters with the unknown man
is a conscious figment, fabricated to meet the exigencies of the situation, evincing a guilty
conscience born of the knowledge of his misfeasance. It was manufactured in the fear that
he might have been seen, and is rank perjury.. . .His resort to perjury and fabrication Is
tantamount to an admission of his guilt and is evidence of his consciousness of that guilt.
. ..The fabrication of testimony raises a presumption against the party guilty of such
practice." (Italics supplied). (Cf. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 468 (1933)).
Horn is still alive. I should like to see a lie detector recording of his answers to three
questions: "(1) Did you hit the man? (2) Did you pass a traffic light? (3) Was there
really an unknown man who spoke to you?" Certainly, had I been the pre-trial judge In
that case, I would have ordered a lie-detector test for Horn, to guide me in recommending
settlement or ordering a preference for trial.
193b. At a "Conference on Criminal Interrogation and Lie Detection" held at Vanderbilt
Hall on November 8, 1952, under the auspices of the New York University Graduate
Division of Public Service, I urged the use of lie detector in pre-trial conferences in order
to assist in expediting the tort jury calendar. I also proposed two new Sections, 306(b) and
353(a), of the Civil Practice Act to read as follows:
"306b Deception Tests
Wherever it shall be relevant to the prosecution or defense of an action, or to a pre-trlal
hearing therein, or wherever it shall be relevant in any proceeding pending in a court of
competent jurisdiction, or a pre-trial hearing therein, the court, by order, shall direct any
party to the action or proceeding, and any person or witness involved in the controversy
to submit to one or more tests for the detection of deception. Such tests shall be made
by duly qualified experts approved by the court and under such restrictions and directions
as to the court or judge shall seem proper. The designation of an expert as qualified by the
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I offered in evidence in an administrative hearing the lie detector
testimony of Dr. Fabian Rouke, and it was received, despite strenuous
objection after competent and rigorous examination of the doctor on the
voir dire. I have heard of a plan to compel alleged "drunken drivers"
to undergo police-station medical tests to determine the quantity of
alcohol in their blood. Of course the constitutional considerations of the
recent "stomach contents" decision will have to be given careful con-
sideration in criminal cases. 94 And in any event the report of the test
may be challenged by evidence tending "to show the procedure followed,
its accuracy, whether any margin of error may exist in the conduct or
results of the tests and the conclusiveness of lack of conclusiveness of
the findings."' 9
5
Letters rogatory190 may be used where an ordinary commission is un-
available. Soviet Russia virtually compels their use in matters Russian,
as they are processed through the diplomatic channel. 0 7
Notices to admit pursuant to Section 322 of the Civil Practice Act may
not be vacated or modified at Special Term.08 If Section 322 is not
complied with by admission or otherwise, the facts are "deemed admitted."
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the department of trial shall be prima fade
proof of his qualification. Whenever such test is ordered and made, the results thereof
shall be receivable in evidence as prima fade proof of the facts found. All circumstances
surrounding the taking of such tests, including the skill and quality of the expert, may be
shown to affect the weight of the results of the tests, but they shall not affect their
admissibility."
"353a. Experts who Administer Deception Tests Pursuant to Court Order.
An expert who administers or supervises a test for the detection of deception pursuant to
order of a court in any action or proceeding or a pre-trial hearing therein shall not be
allowed to disclose a communication made to him by the person tested, except to the
extent relevant to the action or proceeding and to the particular inquiry with respect to
which the test was ordered. Nor shall any clerk, stenographer, technician or other person
employed by such expert be allowed to disclose any such communication except to the same
extent."
194. Frankfurter, J.: "We put to one side cases which have arisen in the State courts
through the use of modem methods and devices for discovering wrongdoers and bringing
them to book." Rochin v. State of Cal, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Cf. Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245, 252-3 (1910); N.Y. VFmcrL AND TRArnc LAWs § 70 (5); People v. Rosen-
heimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913) ; Schmidt v. District Attorney of Monroe County
et al., 255 App. Div. 940, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 787 (4th Dep't 1938).
195. Rochin v. State of Cal., note 194 supra.
196. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 309.
197. Ecco High Frequency Corp. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 276 App. Div. 827, 93
N.Y.S.2d 178 (1st Dep't 1949), affirming, 196 Misc. 405, 94 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. CL);
Matter of Grauds, 180 Misc. 558, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 318 (Surr. Ct. 1943). Cf. Rur.- CIv.
FRAc. 126 and Tamip, A GUmE To Moxro PRAcncE (rev. ed. 1949), at pp. 76-80 of 1951-
1952 Supp.
198. Langan v. First Trust & Dep. Co. et al., 296 N.Y. 1014, 73 N.E.2d 723 (1947),
affirming, 270 App. Div. 700, 62 N.Y. S. 2d 440 (4th Dep't 1946); Belfer v. Dectograph
Products Inc., 275 App. Div. 824, 89 N.Y. S. 2d 125 (1st Dep't 1949).
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And these formal admissions may be used on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings pursuant to Rule 112 and Civil Practice Act Section 476.101
EVIDENCE
The tersest textbook on New York Evidence is Article 33 of the Civil
Practice Act.
A 1951 amendment to Section 412 permits photographic copies of
hospital records to constitute compliance with a subpoena duces tecum.
This elimination of the nuisance of transcription saves the hospital infinite
expense and permits quicker response to lawyers' requests.
I call attention to a well-written article by Mr. C. Bedford Johnson, Jr.,
which he has entitled "Admissibility of Photographic Reproductions of
Writings." 'a It has served the basis for new legislation giving legal
recognition to the commercial world's acceptance of photographic re-
productions as primary evidence (e.g., a bank's "Recordak" system).20
In death actions evidence of dependency is now admissible to enable
the Surrogate or other court having jurisdiction to determine the incidence
of pecuniary loss. Thus a widow with two children may receive 40% or
even 60% of a recovery where normal distribution of her husband's
estate upon intestacy would give her only 331/3%0.202
In annulment actions, Section 1143 of the Civil Practice Act has been
amended to codify the decision in DeBaillet-Latour v. DeBaillet-Latour.203
The amendment makes it clear that in any annulment action, whether
contested or not, the declaration or confession of either party to the
marriage must be corroborated. °4
Since September 1, 1952, in New York City proceedings to review tax
199. Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co., 302 N.Y. 81, 96 N.E. 2d 187 (1950) ; Lloyd v.
R.S.M. Corp., 251 N.Y. 318, 167 N.E. 456 (1929); Kidder v. Hesselman, 119 Misc. 410,
196 N.Y.Supp. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
200. 23 N.Y. ST. BAR BurL. 452-7 (Dec. 1951).
201. See Brief for Manton, pp. 72-7, and Brief for Spector, pp. 35-7, United States v.
Manton et al., 107 F. 2d 834, 844 (2d Cir. 1938) ; MODEL STATE BANxINO CooE §§ 2, 111
(F). Cf. Myres v. United States 174 F. 2d 329 (8th Cir. 1949) ; United States v. Cipullo,
170 F. 2d 311 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Karbney, et al., 155 F. 2d 795 (2d. Cir. 1946).
Cf. United States v. Kushner, 135 F. 2d 668 (2d Cir. 1943). Since September 1, 1952,
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 374(b) permits photographic and photostatic reproductions and
microfilm records of original records made in the regular course of business to be deemed
originals from the standpoint of admissibility in evidence. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 791. See
also RuLEs Civ. PRAc. 10.
202. N.Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 133; In re Sintyago's Estate, 198 Misc. 776, 100 N.Y. S. 2d
556 (Surr. Ct. 1950) ; Matter of Kaiser, 198 Misc. 582, 100 N.Y. S. 2d 218 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
The formulae of these cases are hardly conclusive. Dependency of crippled children, for
example, may extend far beyond majority.
203. 301 N.Y. 428, 94 N.E.2d 715 (1950).
204. See Eighteenth Report J. C. 73 (1952).
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assessments of real property, the justice or referee before whom such
proceedings shall be heard "may inspect the real property which is the
subject of the proceeding." -2 1
Experts to appraise real property in assessing it for taxation or to give
expert testimony in an action or proceeding in connection with any such
assessment may now be employed by a municipal corporation by local
law, ordinance or resolution of the governing legislative body.
-0
Banking organizations may preserve photographic reproductions of
records in compliance with Section 128 of the Banking Law.' 7
Dispositior of county clerks' records, the records of commissioners
of jurors, and similar records, is affected by Chapter 793 of the New York
Laws of 1952.
An "evidence" topic of interest is the question of whether a cross-
examiner may use a book or opinion in cross-examining an expert witness
A recent commentary in this connection is as follows:
".... the examiner will not be permitted to ask the witness if he agrees with
Sir William Osler's famous obser-ation in one of his medical treatises that it
was remarkable how soon after a lawsuit patients suffering from injuries
caused by shock recovered their health."2 "8
But the authorities are in conflict, Wigmore indicating disapproval
of the practice of thus using books.20 In New York, moreover, it has
been held that opinions expressed in treatises of recognized authority
which are at variance with those given on the stand by an expert may not
be received in evidence as "affirmative proof: '2 10 Also, a trial judge's
charge was held "too broad" in stating:
"When an expert takes the stand and gives an opinion, he may ... be shown
other books and other opinions and asked whether he agrees with the books
or the opinions therein contained."211
But this decision is carefully distinguished in Hastings v. Chrysler
Corp. et al.,212 which points out that People v. Riccardi"1' dealt
with a private written report, and not with "treatises and literature of
recognized authority." The latter may be used to impeach a witness on
205. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 568, amending N.Y. Crry Anm. CoDE § 166-1.0 by adding a
new subdivision c.
206. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 257, amending N.Y. CIr Grs-. Mux. Lmv § 98.
207. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 790.
208. Willens, Cross-examining the Expert Witness With the Aid of Books, 41 J. CRM.
L. & CRInmoLoGY 192-8 (1950). See Stone v. Seattle, 33 Wash. 644, 74 Pac. 803 (1903).
209. VI WIGMooa, EVIDENCE § 1700 (3d ed. 1940).
210. McEvoy v. Lommel, 78 App. Div. 324, 327, 80 N.Y. Supp. 71, 73 (Ist Dep't 190).
211. People v. Riccardi, 285 N.Y. 21, 32 N.E. 2d 776 (1941) (Italics mine).
212. 273 App. Div. 292, 77 N.Y. S. 2d 524 (1st Dep't 1948).
213. 285 N.Y. 21, 32 N.E.2d 776 (1941).
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the stand with respect to his knowledge of the subject on which he
professes to be an expert, although if the expert does not concede the
authoritativeness of the literature attempted to be resorted to, it may
not be used on cross-examination.214
The Hastings v. Chrysler distinction of the Riccardi case was cited
with approval by the Court of Appeals itself in People v. Feldman.215
New York has not adopted the proposed Model Code of Evidence.
Indeed, Professor Morgan has written of it:
"The reception which the Model Code of Evidence of the American Law
Institute has met strongly indicates that the bar at any rate is not ready for
codification. 2 1 6
TRIAL
Many lawyers lose sight of the efficacy of Section 443(3)
of the Civil Practice Act, which permits a separate trial of one or more
issues. This is hidden away in the statute, but it is worthy of more
general use, particularly in cases in which there has been a general
release.217
For non-jury trials important amendments have been made to Section
549 of the Civil Practice Act. The doctrine of Corr v. Hoffman 18 to the
effect that a trial court has "no revisory or appellate jurisdiction to
correct by amendment error in substance affecting the judgment" has
been abolished.21 9 The trial court may now correct its errors instead of
directing a new trial, and it may "take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law and render a new decision."
A definition of "interested witnesses" is found in Noseworthy v. City
of New York. 220
If a substantial issue is raised as to the making of a contract to
arbitrate or a submission, or the failure to comply therewith, a jury trial
may now be had, by amendment of Section 1450 of the Civil Practice
Act, effective September 1, 1952.221
The time limit for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
214. I am indebted to Mr. Louis A. Tepper of the New York bar for demonstrating
the impact of the Hastings distinction upon the Riccardi principle.
215. 299 N.Y. 153, 168, 85 N.E.2d 913, 920 (1949).
216. Morgan, 29 TaXAs L. RaV. 587-610 (1951).
217. City of New York v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 134 Misc. 827, 236 N.Y. Supp.
449 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Kye v. Steams, 130 Misc. 28, 223 N.Y. Supp. 582 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
218. 256 N.Y. 254, 268, 176 N.E. 383, 389 (1931).
219. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 218. Cf. Herpe v. Herpe, 225 N.Y. 323, 327, 122 N.E. 204,
205 (1919). See also amendments of 1951 to N.Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT §§ 550 and 551. Cl.
RuL.Es Civ. PrAc. 220, 221 as amended July 28, 1951. See 126 N.Y.L.J. 383, cal. 3
(Sept. 6, 1951).
220. 298 N.Y. 76, 80 N.E.2d 744 (1948).
221. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 762.
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is now governed by the Rules of Civil Practice,2-- the text of which will
be found in the New York Law Journal of September 6, 1951. This is
accomplished by an amendment of Section 457(a) of the Civil Practice
Act.Y "The same term" is no longer the time limit. The new time limit
is fifteen days from the rendition of a verdict or decision, or if no
verdict is returned, from the time of the discharge of the jury; and in
a non-jury case, fifteen days from the date of rendering the decision.2 3
Since July 1, 1952, when alternate jurors are used in a criminal case
the court may direct that one or more of the alternates be kept in the
custody of the sheriff or one or more court officers, separate and apart
from the regular jurors until the jury have agreed upon a verdict. Thus,
if during deliberations a juror dies or becomes ill, the court may order
him to be discharged and utilize the alternate. -2- Perhaps this policy
should be carried over to civil cases where alternate jurors are used.
It is elementary that ordinarily jurors will not be allowed to impeach
their own verdict.2 Yet affidavits of jurors may be considered as to
statements made outside the jury room- 0 or to show that the jury forgot
to consider interest22 " or that the five-sixths rule of Section 463(a)
was not complied with.
In non-jury trials the parties frequently waive formal findings of fact
and conclusions of law. However, even if there is such a waiver and the
case is settled during trial there can be no determination upon the merits
of a non-jury case without something in the nature of findings of fact
222. RuLEs Civ. PiRc. 60 (a).
223. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 588.
223a. N.Y. Civ. P Ac. ACT § 549. See Seventeenth Report J. C. 72-3, 179-204 (1951).
Section 549 provides that the time for making the motion is to be "prescribed by the rules
of civil pmctice." Supplementing this, a new Rule 60(a) fixes the time at fifteen days from
the rendition of a verdict or decision, or if no verdict is returned, from the time of discharge
of the jury; and in a non-jury case, fifteen days from the date of rendering the decisson. Thus
"the same term" is no longer the time limit. (See 126 N.Y.L.J. 383, col. 3 (Sept. 6, 1951),
for text of new Rule 60(a) ).
224. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 670, amending N.Y. CODE Cami. Pnoc. § 358(a).
225. McDonald et al. v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Payne v. Burke et al., 262 N.Y.
630, 188 N.E. 96 (1933); Miller v. Mattem et af., 149 isc. 883, 263 N.Y.Supp. 296
(Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 782, 270 N.Y. Supp. 1002 (3d Dep't 1934); Wirt v.
Reed, 138 App. Div. 760, 123 N.Y. Supp. 706 (1st Dep't 1910); Gambon et al. v. City of
New York et al., 153 Misc. 401, 274 N.Y. Supp. 653 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
226. People v. Durling, 303 N.Y. 382, 103 N.E.2d 336 (1952); McHugh v. Jones, 283
N.Y. 534, 29 N.E.2d 76 (1940); People v. Leonti, 262 N.Y. 256, 186 N.E. 693 (1933);
Reed v. Cook et a., 103 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Wilkins v. Abbey, 163 Misc.
416, 5 N.Y. S. 2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
226a. Mayaguez Drug Co. v. Globe & Rutger Fire Ins. Co., 260 N.Y. 356, 183 N.E.
523 (1932).
227. See note 226 suPra.
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sufficient to apprise the parties and the appellate courts of what facts
were essential to the trial court's determination.2 8
The parties can compel formal findings of fact in a non-jury case if
they submit proposed findings with or before the submission of their final
briefs after the trial.229
JUDGMENT, TENDER, EXECUTION AND COSTS
1. Judgment
My conclusions on the subject "Declaratory Judgments versus Ad-
visory Opinions-Evolution against Revolution" were summarized in
the form of so-called "Ten Commandments" governing declaratory judg-
ments which were published on the first page of the New York Law
Journal of December 2, 194 1." °
A resurvey, from the years 1941 through 1949, is found under the
heading "Development of Law, Declaratory Judgments" in 62 Harvard
Law Review 787-885. My 1941 conclusions in the light of that resurvey
continue to be my present conclusions.
A declaratory judgment may be in rem or in personam.23'
Perhaps the best New York declaratory judgment decision is N. Y.
Foreign Trade Zone Operators Inc. v. State Liquor Authority et al. 2
A judgment must state the residence address of the person in whose
favor the judgment was rendered2- 3 and the trade and last known address
of the judgment debtor. 34
Affidavits of "no military service" are governed by Military Law
Section 303, and "interest" is governed by Civil Practice Act Section 480.
2. Tender
Civil Practice Act Section 112(g), relating to restoration of benefits
by a party seeking to have a transaction declared void, has been amended
228. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co. et al., 323 U. S. 173, 185 (1944);
American Tobacco Co. et al. v. The Katingo-Hadjapatera et al., 194 F. 2d 449 (2d Cir.
1951) ; United States v. Forness et al., 125 F. 2d 928, 942, 943 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Querze v.
Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E. 2d 423 (1943) ; Steel Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals
Corp., 277 App. Div. 687, 102 N.Y. S. 2d 655 (1st Dep't 1951) ; Mason v. Lory Dress Co.
et a!., 277 App. Div. 660, 102 N.Y. S. 2d 285 (1st Dep't 1951) ; Shaffer v. Martin et al.,
20 App. Div. 304, 46 N.Y. Supp. 992 (4th Dep't 1897).
229. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §439.
230. They will be found amplified in CARMODY, MANUAL OF NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
634-9 (1946), under the heading Principles Regulating One's Right to Resort to an Action
for a Declaratory Judgment.
231. Redfield et al. v. Critchley et al., 277 N.Y. 336, 339, 14 N.E. 2d 377 (1938). At
least, this is what I deduce from the court's reference to an "unwarranted conclusion."
232. 285 N.Y. 272, 34 N.E. 2d 316 (1941).
233. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT. § 501(2).
234. N.Y. Crv. PpAc. ACT. § 501(1).
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to make it clearly applicable to transactions found by courts to be "void"
from the time of their execution as well as to those found to be "voidable"
and declared void at the request of the party entitled to rescission.'
3. Execution
Direct levy of execution against a money debt or contract obligation
is now permitted by a new Section 687(a) of the Civil Practice Act. This
harmonizes with the law which permits the levy of execution against a
debt which has been attached. Since September 1, 1952, the levy of
execution is permitted whether or not an attachment has been levied.1
4. Costs
Compulsive deterrents to suing in a higher court when one should sue
in a lower court are found in amendments to Civil Practice Act Section
1474, subdivisions 1 and 2, which provide that a plaintiff may recover
no costs or disbursements if he sued in the Supreme Court and recovered
under $4000 when he could have sued in the City Court. Similarly, if he
sued in the City Court and recovered under $1500 when he could have
sued in the Municipal Court.2 7 A new and simple bill of costs (aggregat-
ing $150) is provided for Supreme Court cases within New York City.23
Thirteen items have become three, based upon average amounts derived
from a county clerks' survey. In the City Court, costs are increased to
Supreme Court amounts 9 and maximum costs in the Municipal Court
are increased from $75 to $150.' °
The $50 costs item heretofore in Civil Practice Act Section 1472 has
been increased to $10041
MISCELLANEOUS
Effective September 1, 1952, no waiver of the right to be represented
by an attorney in any arbitration proceeding shall be effective unless the
waiver is evidenced by a writing expressly so providing, signed by the
party requesting such representation, or unless the party fails to assert
such right at the beginning of the hearing.2
235. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 487. See LEG. Doc. No. 65 K (1952).
236. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 835.
237. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 430. See Eighteenth Report J.C. 55 (1952).
238. N.Y. Civ. PRc. AcT § 1504(a), added by N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 502.
239. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 502.
240. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 503, amending N.Y. CrLa hlui. CT. CODE § 164 (14).
241. N.Y Laws 1951, c. 160.
242. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 547. See Eighteenth Report J. C. 57 (1952). Space does not
permit review of about twenty miscellaneous practice statutes analyzed in 24 N.Y. ST. BAr
BuLL. 144-5 (1952). See also id. at 139-44 with respect to 1952 increases in judicial salaries
and related matters.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
APPEALS
Upon a reversal or modification, an appellate court must now state the
grounds of its decision.243
A new Civil Practice Act Section 592 (a) prevents dismissal of an
appeal from an order even though a subsequent order, unappealed from,
granted reargument and adhered, or granted resettlement, or denied leave
to renew.244 The appellate court, in its discretion, may review the
subsequent order 245
The deadly appellate trap of People ex rel. Manhattan Storage &
Warehouse Co. v. Lilly24 continues to exist, causing time to appeal to
run from the date of entry, as against a litigant who submitted a pro-
posed order or judgment for signature. He is deemed to have entered
it himself, although he is utterly ignorant of the fact of entry. This rule
is nothing short of professional murder, particularly since no court
possesses the power to extend the time in which to take an appeal." T
Time to appeal is extended so as to give a party upon whom a notice
of appeal is served "ten days to appeal in every case, except where he
would have a longer period" otherwise provided by law. This eliminates
the "forced" initiation of appellate review where a litigant does not want
to appeal unless his adversary does, hopes that this adversary will not,
yet fears that he may at the last moment, just before the normally
unextendable time to appeal runs out.24 8
Appeals in Civil Service disciplinary matters are affected by amendment
of Section 22(3), of the Civil Service Law.249
There can be no stipulation for judgment absolute in divorce cases.260
Records on appeal have been somewhat shortened. 251
For those in the higher reaches of appellate practice, two interesting
decisions with respect to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals are
Scarnato v. State of New York,152 (indicating an enlargement of the
Court's jurisdiction to review questions of fact), and Gambold v.
MacLean et al.253
243. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 595, amending N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. AcT § 584(1).
244. N.Y. Laws 1951, c. 258.
245. Seventeenth Report J.C. 205-11 (1951).
246. 299 N.Y. 281, 86 N. E. 2d 747 (1949).
247. Terwilliger v. Browning, King & Co., 207 N.Y. 479, 101 N.E. 463 (1913).
248. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 291. See Eighteenth Report J. C. and supporting study D (1952).
249. N.Y. Laws 1952, c. 398.
250. Weiman v. Weiman, 295 N.Y. 150, 65 N.E. 2d 754 (1946); RuLas Civ. PRAC. 283.
251. RULES C1v. PR c. 232, 234, as amended July 2, 1951.
252. 298 N.Y. 376, 83 N.E.2d 841 (1949).
253. 254 N.Y. 357, 173 N. E. 220 (1930), presenting a case of an appeal directly to
the Court of Appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court without going through the
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At the 1951 election the people approved a new subdivision 5 for
New York Constitution Article VI, Section 7. This permits an appeal
to the Court of Appeals on a question of law from a non-final order in
a proceeding by or against a public officer, tribunal or court. Thus an
administrative tribunal need no longer stipulate for judgment absolute if
the Appellate Division refuses to grant leave to appeal on a certified
question.2"
I have stipulated for judgment absolute only once in my career, specifi-
cally relying upon and endeavoring to emulate Mr. Frederick Bryan's
great victory in Curcio v. City of New York," but, alas, one should
never be in a hurry about dying, getting married, resting a plaintiff's
case or stipulating for judgment absolute. In the manner of Judge James
Garrett Wallace's song, I was affirmed without opinion with appropriate
overtones from Chopin.
And thus I become philosophical, endeavoring to evaluate the panorama
all at once, and finding solace in the last paragraph of Glenn's work on
Liquidation:
"If some of our late reforms have missed the true mark, still we have the
rest of the structure; and better still, our history justifies the confidence that
while the bad cannot last, the good will remain."""
Indeed, my optimism in the progress of things procedural is such that
I fly with enthusiasm to paraphrase a great question posed about thirty
years ago by Sir John Salmond, profound author of Salmond on Juris-
prudence:
"Through centuries of slow development we have gathered together the
materials for the greatest system of law that the world has ever known. Is it
too much to hope that we are now approaching the end of that long era, and
that, procedurally speaking, at least, we are ready to build up these materials
into a stately monument of perfect form which will endure forever as one of
the great contributions of this century to the cause of Truth, Justice andCivilization?"151
Appellate Division, yet reviewing a determination of the Appellate Division affirming an
interlocutory judgment. See N.Y. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 7.
254. See Matter of Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Maltbie, 298 N.Y. 680, 82 N.E.2d
582 (1948); Matter of Epstein v. Board of Regents, 295 N.Y. 154, 157, 65 N.E. 2d 7S6,
757 (1946); BEiyA=sxT, ADnmisArnTr ADJUDicA O. u NEr YONR , 366-S (1942).
255. 275 N.Y. 20, 9 N.E.2d 760 (1937).
256. GLa.N-x, LiQmxrsAio 879 (1st ed. 1935).
257. See 22 CoL. L. R v. 197, 203 (1922).
